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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The construction of something cogent and coherent 
enough to be called Wittgenstein's theory of aesthetics is a 
difficult task, one made more difficult by Wittgenstein's 
own reluctance to assist. Although he had very decided 
opinions about art and aesthetics, he never organized his 
informal remarks and lectures into formal theory. 
When he gave the lectures that were published as 
Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and 
Religious Belief, Wittgenstein asked that his words not be 
recorded because: 
If you write these spontaneous remarks down, some 
day someone may publish them as my considered opinions. 
I don't want that done. For I am talking now freely as 
my ideas come, but all this will need a lot more 
thought and better expression (Monk, 403}. 
His reluctance stemmed from the concern that these were not 
his "considered opinions", but extemporaneous remarks that 
would need revision before they were suitable for 
publication. Regardless, many of these unconsidered remarks 
have been published and serve as the major source of his 
aesthetic ideas. 
Unfortunately, as is often the case with personal 
notes, they are not always clear to an outside reader. There 
are multiple versions of the same notes, including earlier 
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versions of notes later included in the Philosophical 
Investigations. Lecture notes preserved by his students can 
be misleading because of the spontaneity of his lecture 
style. There is no guarantee that what was written down in 
class actually corresponds to conclusions later reached. 
Such ideas were not intended to represent the fullness of 
thought and reflection of which he was capable. As Norman 
Malcolm describes it in his memoir, Wittgenstein ad libbed 
his lectures, preferring not to use notes that he felt made 
his ideas seem stale and dry. Instead of listening to the 
presentation of previously worked out ideas, his classes 
watched as Wittgenstein thrashed things out in front of 
them. (Malcolm, 24} . 
The publication of his ideas in such scattered and 
unfinished form as they have appeared would probably have 
greatly disturbed Wittgenstein. He had what amounted to 
almost a horror of being misrepresented, and "he was of the 
opinion ... that his ideas were usually misunderstood and 
distorted even by those who professed to be his disciples" 
(Malcolm, 11} . 
This opinion was probably justified. While Wittgenstein 
has been very influential in recent philosophy, the 
influence has been selective. The majority of texts that 
comment on or interpret his philosophy do not deal with his 
ideas about ethics or aesthetics except in passing. This may 
be because his ideas do not fit well within the scope of 
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analytic philosophy. Until recently, the greater part of the 
articles that did mention Wittgenstein's aesthetic ideas did 
so only from the analytic perspective. This caused the 
authors virtually to ignore the more interesting and 
original aspects of his ideas, which will be explored in 
this thesis. 
The primary idea these authors did adopt was 
Wittgenstein's pictorial theory of language, which he 
himself later rejected. This theory of language was 
presented in his earliest work, the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, and it was very influential in the early 
positivist and linguistic schools of thought. His ideas of 
language were seen as being in line with those of G. E. 
Moore and Bertrand Russell, and his works were influential 
in analytic aesthetics, although again, the influence was 
selective (Tilghman, 10) . 
Wittgenstein's early ideas made him very attractive to 
the positivists. His pictorial theory of language ascribed a 
one-to-one correspondence between language and the objects 
of language. This seemingly placed theories of ethics and 
aesthetics right where the positivists wanted them: in the 
realm of senselessness. The terms used by these theories had 
no objects to correspond with in the concrete world, and so 
language was powerless to discuss them in any logical or 
meaningful way. 
Some of Wittgenstein's comments did seem to support 
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this view. When he said in the Tractatus that "it is clear 
that ethics cannot be put into words" and that "ethics and 
aesthetics are one and the same" {Wittgenstein 1961, 147), 
it did seem as if he were saying that there was nothing 
which could be said about these areas. If nothing can be put 
into words, then it must be because there is nothing that 
can be said. The positivists understood this to mean that 
nothing could be said because such areas are nonsense, 
having no logical sense. If there were any sense, then 
logically, it could be formed into language. 
It would be very curious if this were Wittgenstein's 
intent, for he himself saw his work as being entirely 
ethical in origin, and saw questions of ethics and 
aesthetics as being far from senseless. While he was working 
to get the text of the Tractatus published, he wrote to 
Ludwig von Ficker, a German publisher with whom he had had 
earlier dealings, and said {concerning the text): 
.... it will probably be helpful for you if I write a 
few words about my book: For you won't--I really 
believe--get too much out of reading it. Because you 
won't understand it; the content will seem quite 
strange to you. In reality, it isn't strange to you, 
for the point of the book is ethical {Luckhardt, 94). 
Obviously, if Wittgenstein felt that the whole point of the 
book was ethical, he could not have felt that the whole idea 
of ethics was senseless. The difficulty lies in discerning 
exactly what he meant by "ethical", and hence by "aesthet-
ics". The Tractatus is not an ethical text in the usually 
accepted sense. It is instead a text that attempts to set 
the limits of what can be logically and rationally talked 
about in order to highlight and outline the areas that are 
beyond rational, logical discussion. Wittgenstein does not 
have anything further to say about ethics (aesthetics) 
because what can be said cannot show what is important. 
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What is important is a matter for some sort of 
perception beyond the logical and rational, something that 
comes closer to intuition than rational thought. The purpose 
of this paper is to explore and define Wittgenstein's 
aesthetic ideas with an eye towards demonstrating the 
importance of this intuitive perception and the role it 
plays, along with aesthetics, in our lives. The aesthetic 
ideas that we will explore include: the development of the 
aesthetic vocabulary and demonstrations of how it is used; a 
discussion of the impossibility of developing a "science of 
aesthetics"; the development of and the role played by 
aesthetic rules; the necessity of aesthetic context to the 
development of those rules; and the mastery of such a 
context and the rules that make aesthetic judgment possible. 
In conclusion, I hope to demonstrate the importance of art 
in its relation to ethics and to life itself, at least as 
Wittgenstein saw it. 
CHAPTER 2 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AESTHETIC VOCABULARY 
From Pictures to Games 
Considering the enthusiastic reception of the Tracta-
tus, it seems somewhat curious that Wittgenstein could so 
completely reject the pictorial theory of language. As 
described in the introduction to this thesis, this theory 
proposed a one to one correspondence between language and 
the world. A linguistic description "paints a picture" of 
objects in the world, with the elements of language 
corresponding to objects in the world. Any logical 
proposition is thus a linguistic picture of that which it 
describes. In his memoir of Wittgenstein, Norman Malcolm 
recounts the incident that led to the development of the 
pictorial theory of language: 
Wittgenstein related to me two anecdotes pertain-
ing to the Tractatus ... One has to do with the 
origination of the central idea of the Tractatus--that 
a proposition is a picture. This idea came to Wittgen-
stein when he was serving in the Austrian army in the 
First War. He saw a newspaper that described the occur-
rence and location of an automobile accident by means 
of a diagram or map. It occurred to Wittgenstein that 
this map was a proposition and that therein was re-
vealed the essential nature of propositions--namely, to 
picture reality {Malcolm, 69). 
From this incident, a detailed and precise account of 
language and its relation to the world developed. Indeed, 
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Wittgenstein himself felt that with the completion of the 
Tractatus he had said all that could logically be said 
concerning philosophy and the nature of the world. "He had, 
he thought, completed a book that provided a definitive and 
unassailably true solution to the problems of philosophy" 
(Monk, 173). This "definitive" solution dismissed the 
problems of ethics, aesthetics and religion by relegating 
them to the realm of things of which we cannot speak. 
Cannot, because there are no objects corresponding to such 
areas, and language is a description of objects. These 
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issues exist outside the purview of logical thought, outside 
"reality", and cannot be discussed in logical terms. From 
this viewpoint, language is simply not capable of producing 
meaningful answers to ethical and religious questions. 
Indeed, we cannot even frame meaningful questions, if by 
meaningful we mean logical. As mentioned above on page 4, 
the ramifications of this theory as construed by most 
analytical philosophy delighted the positivists, and 
Wittgenstein's ideas were ultimately widely received and 
acclaimed. 
What then, led Wittgenstein himself to reject this 
theory? The second anecdote mentioned by Norman Malcolm 
(p.6) gives the story behind its ultimate rejection. 
The other incident has to do with something that 
precipitated the destruction of this conception. Witt-
genstein and P. Sraffa, a lecturer in economics at 
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Cambridge, argued together a great deal over the ideas 
of the Tractatus. One day ... when Wittgenstein was 
insisting that a proposition and that which it de-
scribes must have the same 'logical form', the same 
'logical multiplicity', Sraffa made a gesture, familiar 
to Neapolitans as meaning something like disgust or 
contempt, of brushing the underneath of his chin with 
an outward sweep of the finger-tips of one hand. And he 
asked: 'What is the logical form of that?' Sraffa's 
example produced in Wittgenstein the feeling that there 
was an absurdity in the insistence that a proposition 
and what it describes must have the same 'form'. This 
broke the hold on him of the conception that a proposi-
tion must literally be a 'picture' of the reality it 
describes {Malcolm, 69). 
This gesture, and the fact that it was "simply" a gesture, 
{gestures were to become a very important part of his ideas 
concerning aesthetics) made Wittgenstein aware of flaws in 
his conception that he had not previously seen. Ray Monk, in 
his biography of Wittgenstein, says that the very nature of 
Sraffa's criticism was so sweeping that it could force a 
whole new perspective on Wittgenstein, in a way that a more 
detailed and mathematically or philosophically oriented 
argument could not {Monk, 260). 
According to Monk, Wittgenstein felt that Sraffa's 
influence brought him to the point of looking at philosophi-
cal problems from an 'anthropological' viewpoint. He ceased 
to view language as existing separate and apart from its 
environment, and instead focused on the idea that language 
gets its meaning from the context in which it is used. This 
led to the development of the language-game, the predominant 
linguistic image of the Philosophical Investigations. As 
Monk says, "a 'language-game' cannot be described without 
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mentioning the activities and the way of life of the 'tribe' 
that plays it" (Monk, 261). 
This change of perspective meshed well with 
Wittgenstein's view of aesthetics. Whereas you could not say 
anything substantive about the nature of art and aesthetics 
from the logical, rational perspective of the pictorial 
theory, the idea of language games was more flexible. 
The Aesthetic Language Game 
The Idea of a Language Game 
The idea of language games in general can be illustrat-
ed using the aesthetic language game. In language games, 
like other sorts of games, you are constrained by the con-
text and rules. Each game has its own guidelines and 
conditions which make it recognizable as the game it is. If 
I saw someone using certain recognizable objects in familiar 
circumstances, using them according to a particular scheme 
of usage, I could identify the game they were playing with a 
certain degree of accuracy, given that this was a game with 
which I was familiar. For example, if I saw a board covered 
with squares of two alternating colors, arranged so that no 
two squares of the same color shared a side, and two sets of 
playing pieces, each set of a different color, and each 
including a certain variety of pieces, I might assume that 
it was a chess board, if I was familiar with that game. If I 
10 
continued to watch, and the moves that were made seemed to 
correspond with the game I call chess, I could then say with 
relative certainty that they were playing chess. 
Being able to identify this game as chess assumes that 
I, as observer, have somehow learned the names of the 
objects and the rules of movement associated with the game 
called chess. Similarly, in order to identify and 
participate in the particular language game associated with 
aesthetics, I must be able to identify the terms and 
guidelines that go to make up the aesthetic language game. 
Building an Aesthetic Vocabulary 
Primitive Language Games. Just as my ability to identi-
fy a game as chess presumes that I have at some point 
learned the terms and rules associated with chess, so an 
ability to participate in the aesthetic language game as-
sumes that I have learned the terms and rules associated 
with art and aesthetics, and that I have become familiar 
with the vocabulary necessary to an aesthetic discussion. To 
account for this familiarization requires some idea of how 
we originally learned the vocabulary. 
One thing we always do when discussing a word is 
to ask how we were taught it. Doing this on one hand 
destroys a variety of misconceptions, on the other hand 
gives you a primitive language in which the word is 
used. Although this language is not what you talk when 
you are twenty, you get a rough approximation to what 
kind of language game is going to be played (Wittgen-
stein 1972, 1). 
This "primitive language" refers in part to the context 
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in which we first learned the meaning of a word as children. 
This context is directly related to the usage that this term 
has in the aesthetic language game; the difference between 
the role the word plays in the primitive language game and 
the role that it plays in the more sophisticated aesthetic 
language game is simply a matter of degree. 
For example, how I use terms like 'beautiful' or 
'good' is directly related to the way in which the term was 
used when I learned how to use it. As Wittgenstein explains, 
adjectival terms of this sort are first learned as 
interjections, and usually in reference to food. 
(Wittgenstein 1972, 2). Perhaps he is thinking of the 
situation in which a parent, having fed a child a spoonful 
of food, will make various noises, (muutlltun!} smile widely and 
say "isn't that good!". The child learns to associate the 
term 'good' with certain expressions and a positive reaction 
to food. Later, she applies the term in different but 
related situations that evoke a similar positive reaction, 
adjusting the meaning of the term in the process. 
Wittgenstein stressed the role played by the noises, 
gestures and facial expressions accompanying the word being 
"taught" in this primitive language game. 
One thing that is immensely important in teaching is 
exaggerated gestures and facial expressions. The word 
is taught as a substitute for a facial expression or a 
gesture. The gestures, tones of voice, etc., in this 
case are expressions of approval. What makes the word 
an interjection of approval? It is the game it appears 
in ... (Wittgenstein 1972, 2}. 
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The faces and gestures that people make, accompanied by 
appropriate noises and words, teach us the primitive lan-
guage that evolves into the language games we are familiar 
with as adults. I learn and expand the meaning of a word 
such as "good" by associating different experiences from 
different contexts that evoke reactions and gestures similar 
to those in the primitive language game that went with my 
tasting "good" food. If the actions of my parents were 
smiles and laughter, words they used have positive, pleasant 
(or stronger than pleasant) associations for me. Similarly, 
if I behaved "badly", their strong negative reactions, 
perhaps with raised voices and expressive gestures, taught 
me the meaning of "bad" and gave it strong negative 
associations. As I developed language skill, positive and 
negative reinforcment encouraged the proper use of these 
aesthetic terms, where proper means the usage that is common 
in my environment. "Beauty" and "ugliness" were learned in a 
similar way. "Oh, isn't that beautiful!" was accompanied by 
smiles, gasps, expansive gestures, clapping. Therefore, when 
I find a performance particularly moving and beautiful, I 
stand up and clap my heart out. To express my displeasure I 
frown, wrinkle my nose or purse my lips. 
Thus, the meaning of words is developed and learned 
from the contexts in which they are used and the manner in 
which they are applied. As our context shifts, so does the 
manner in which our vocabulary is applied. The word 'good' 
applied to food has a different but related meaning to the 
same word when applied to art. What has changed is the 
context. 
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I see roughly this--there is a realm of utterance 
of delight, when you taste pleasant food or smell a 
pleasant smell, etc., then there is the realm of Art 
which is quite different, though often you may make the 
same face when you hear a piece of music as when you 
taste good food (Wittgenstein 1972, 11). 
It is this similarity of gestures, of expression, that leads 
us to a similarity of vocal expression as well. This is what 
Wittgenstein termed a "family of meanings" (Wittgenstein 
1958, 36e). We use similar terms in aesthetics and ethics: 
good, bad, correct, wrong, etc.; each of these words has a 
family of meanings that relates how the word is used in our 
primitive language games to how we use it in ethical and 
aesthetic language games. This concept is particularly clear 
in the following passage. 
Supposing you meet someone in the street and he 
tells you he has lost his greatest friend, in a voice 
extremely expressive of his emotion. You might say: "It 
was extraordinarily beautiful, the way he expressed 
himself." Supposing you then asked: "What similarity 
has my admiring this person with my eating vanilla ice 
and liking it?" To compare them seems almost disgusting 
(but you can connect them by intermediate cases.) 
Suppose someone said: "But this is a quite different 
kind of delight." But did you learn two meanings of 
'delight'? You use the same word on both occasions. 
There is some connection between these delights. 
(Wittgenstein 1972, 12). 
The Context of the Language Game. This context of 
understanding extends further than the individual. In the 
aesthetic language game, we assume that other people who use 
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terms with which we are familiar are using them in the same 
way that we are using them. We assume that they learned 
their vocabulary under similar conditions, and that there-
fore we are safe in trusting our understanding of their use 
of familiar terms. If I were to come across someone who used 
the term 'beauty' in an entirely unfamiliar way, I should 
either have to determine the relation between her use of the 
term and mine, or decide that we are in fact playing 
different language games. 
This becomes most striking when examined in terms of an 
unfamiliar culture. If we did not use the same language, how 
could we determine what they valued, or what was important 
to them? According to Wittgenstein, we would revert to our 
primitive language context. 
If you came to a foreign tribe, whose language you 
didn't know at all and you wished to know what words 
corresponded to 'good', 'fine', etc., what would you 
look for? You would look for smiles, gestures, foods, 
toys ... If you went to Mars and men were spheres with 
sticks coming out, you wouldn't know what to look for. 
Or if you went to a tribe where noises made with the 
mouth were just breathing or making music, and language 
was made with the ears .... You compare the branches 
with arms. Certainly we must interpret the gestures of 
the tribe on the analogy of ours .... We don't start 
from certain words, but from certain occasions or 
activities (Wittgenstein 1972, 2-3}. 
What is most important is the context and the way in which 
we use words, not the words themselves. We demonstrate our 
facility and the sophistication of our ability to play in 
the aesthetic language game by the way we use and surpass 
our primitive vocabulary. For Wittgenstein, true masters of 
the game seldom use this vocabulary, because of its 
limitations. 
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The Nature of Aesthetic Discussion. When faced with 
great beauty or great horror, we often find ourselves "at a 
loss for words." We make sounds of delight or pain, using 
gestures and exaggerated facial expressions to indicate our 
emotions, because saying that it is beautiful or horrible is 
inadequate. For Wittgenstein, these gestures remain the most 
basic expressions of understanding, serving to express 
comprehension as well as or perhaps better than the words 
with which we learn to replace them. Our gestures can convey 
a wealth of meaning and an associated cultural context much 
more effectively than language can, as evidenced by Sraffa's 
gesture. Words fail us because they seem inadequate. 
As long as our language game is restricted to such 
primitive gestures and expressions, problematic questions 
about the nature of beauty and the constitution of a work of 
art are not an issue. It is when we try to move beyond these 
gestures that such questions arise. The problem is that our 
simple aesthetic vocabulary is not up to the task because 
its expressiveness is limited. It can express the character 
of a work, but say little more about the work itself and the 
role it plays in human life. 
Once we start trying to tackle such questions directly 
and articulate them logically and rationally, we find 
ourselves at a loss for words, trying to satisfy ourselves 
with expressions that do not tell us why something is 
beautiful, but simply that it is. If you are not satisfied 
with stopping there, you find yourself searching for other 
means of expression. We say that an artwork is good, and 
when we try to explain why, we leave behind the words like 
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'fine' and 'good', and turn to discussions of technique and 
style, using words with more normative meanings. The ques-
tion of why we think it is beautiful goes beyond the simple 
stating of it. By describing the color, the shape, the 
texture and other objective features, we try to convey the 
response that the artwork evokes. By comparison with other 
artworks, we attempt to pin down why it is that this artwork 
evokes this response, while another does not. 
Note that in an aesthetic controversy the word 
'beautiful' is scarcely ever used. A different sort of 
word crops up: 'correct', 'incorrect', 'right', 
'wrong'. We never say "This is beautiful enough." We 
only use it to say, "Look, how beautiful," that is, to 
call attention to something (Wittgenstein 1979, 36-7). 
Aesthetic adjectives are used to draw attention, to 
indicate a quality, but if we want to discuss an artwork a 
normative vocabulary is more useful. 'Beauty' is too tenu-
ous, too variable, perhaps. It admits of degrees, but to 
define these degrees and distinguish between them requires a 
different sort of language. And even then, my definition may 
exist outside of language itself. 
If I say A has beautiful eyes someone may ask me: 
what do you find beautiful about his eyes, and perhaps 
I shall reply: the almond shape, long eye-lashes, 
delicate lids. What do these eyes have in common with a 
Gothic church that I find beautiful too? Should I say 
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they make a similar impression on me? What if I were to 
say that in both cases my hand feels tempted to draw 
them? That at any rate would be a narrow definition of 
the beautiful (Wittgenstein 1980, 24e). 
Here the boundaries of language are reached. He can 
articulate what he finds beautiful, but when asked about 
beauty itself, his response is a gesture. Beauty is defined 
as my response to it. What is beauty? It is that which 
brings forth laughter, brings forth tears, that which evokes 
the response that I have learned accompanies beauty. After 
all our work developing a more sophisticated language game, 
I am left with a primitive response. 
Understanding and explaining a musical phrase. 
Sometimes the simplest explanation is a gesture; on 
another occasion it might be a dance step, or words 
describing a dance. - But isn't understanding the 
phrase experiencing something whilst we hear it? In 
that case what part does the explanation play? Are we 
supposed to think of it as we hear the music? Are we 
supposed to imagine the dance, or whatever it may be, 
while we listen? And suppose we do do this - why should 
that be called listening to the music with understand-
ing? If seeing the dance is what is important, it would 
be better to perform that rather than the music. But 
that is all misunderstanding .... 
If I now ask "so what do I actually experience 
when I hear this theme and understand what I hear?" 
nothing occurs to me by way of reply except triviali-
ties. Images, sensations of movement, recollections and 
such like. 
Perhaps I say, "I respond to it" - but what does 
that mean? It might mean something like: I gesture in 
time with the music. And if we point out that for the 
most part this only happens to a very rudimentary 
extent, we shall probably get the reply that such 
rudimentary movements are filled out by images. But 
suppose we assume all the same that someone accompanies 
the music with movements in full measure, - to what 
extent does that amount to understanding it? Do I want 
to say that the movements he makes constitute his 
understanding ... ? What is true is that in some 
circumstances I will take the movements he makes as a 
sign that he understands (Wittgenstein 1980, 69e-70e}. 
18 
The gesture is the understanding, and the response evoked is 
as far as we can go in expressing this understanding. To try 
to go further in this manner is to attempt to breach the 
barrier established by logic and reason. It is an attempt to 
play the aesthetic language game by rules that belong to 
some other game. It is a misunderstanding of the game 
itself. 
CHAPTER 3 
AESTHETIC PUZZLES 
The Science of Aesthetics 
It disturbed Wittgenstein when he saw the kinds of 
language games that people tried to play with art. It was as 
if they were trying to develop a "science" of aesthetics, 
with hypotheses, experiments, and provable results. "You 
might think Aesthetics is a science telling us what's beau-
tiful - almost too ridiculous for words. I suppose it ought 
to include also what sort of coffee tastes well" (Wittgen-
stein 1972, 11). Since the words used in aesthetic response 
and discussion have a family of meanings, trying to define 
these terms to the extent called for in a scientific under-
taking is a hopeless task. "Good" does not have one single 
meaning, indicating the same degree of pleasure or satisfac-
tion each time I use it; its meaning is culturally and 
contextually dependent. 
The desire to make aesthetics into a science is 
particularly ludicrous from Wittgenstein's point of view, 
considering his comments concerning the impossibility of 
discussing art and aesthetic understanding. If we cannot say 
anything rational about it, we certainly cannot make a 
science out of it. But as Wittgenstein saw it, there was a 
strong desire for predictability and solvability. 
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What would the advantages of such a science be? If we 
could just get all the right terms and the aesthetic re-
sponses pinned down in a logical, rational fashion, then all 
the aesthetic questions could be resolved, all those ques-
tions that do not seem clearly answerable if Wittgenstein is 
right. If we have a definition of beauty, or a definition of 
art, then we can clearly delineate what is art and what is 
not. This would please people who want to be able to 
quantify the value in an artwork, making it easily 
analyzable and explainable. There is desire for consistency, 
a desire for an explanation of why an artwork affects us in 
the way it does, an explanation that Wittgenstein does not 
see as valuable, even if it were possible. 
I give someone an explanation and tell him "It's 
as though ... "; then he says "Yes, now I understand it" 
or "Yes, now I see how it's to be played." It's most 
important that he didn't have to accept the expla-
nation; it's not as though I had, as it were, given him 
conclusive reasons for thinking that this passage 
should be compared with that and the other one. I don't 
e.g., explain to him that according to things the 
composer has said this passage is supposed to represent 
such and such (Wittgenstein 1972, 69e). 
It is the search for such "conclusive reasons" that drives 
those who desire a Science of Aesthetics. 
For Wittgenstein, an explanation is either sufficient, 
or it is not. There is no proving, no "conclusive reason" 
that I should accept what is presented to me. As will be 
seen below, the explanation either "clicks" or it fails, but 
I cannot be made to understand by being presented with 
conclusive proof. The types of explanations of which 
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aesthetics is capable are of a different sort, not 
susceptible of proof. 
People often say that aesthetics is a branch of 
psychology. The idea is that once we are more advanced, 
everything - all the mysteries of Art - will be under-
stood by psychological experiment. Exceedingly stupid 
as this idea is, this is roughly it. 
Aesthetic questions have nothing to do with psy-
chological experiments but are answered in an entirely 
different way (Wittgenstein 1972, 17). 
The idea is that if we can just get the right experiment, 
perhaps expose X number of people to Y number of art works 
and measure their response, we will be able to predict the 
type of works to which people will respond favorably. No 
need to wonder if an artist will be successful, we have a 
test for that! However, tests of this sort are irrelevant as 
far as aesthetics is concerned. The explanation sought by 
science is more likely to destroy aesthetic perception than 
to solve aesthetic puzzles. 
The mathematician too can wonder at the 
miracles ... of nature of course; but can he do so once a 
problem has arisen about what it actually is he is 
contemplating? Is it really possible as long as the 
object that he finds astonishing and gazes at with awe 
is sl1rouded in a philosophical fog? 
I could imagine somebody might admire not only 
real trees, but also the shadows or reflections that 
they cast, taking them too for trees. But once he has 
told himself that these are not really trees after all 
and has come to be puzzled at what they are, or at how 
they are related to trees, his admiration will have 
suffered a rupture that will need healing (Wittgenstein 
1980, 57 e) . 
This "rupture" is the break between seeing something 
with an aesthetic eye and seeing it with the scientific eye. 
The former appreciates and seeks meaning, while the latter 
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analyzes, breaks down, and seeks information. For Wittgen-
stein this is the wrong way of looking. "Do not forget that 
a poem, even though it is composed in the language of infor-
mation, is not used in the language game of information" 
(Wittgenstein 1980, 28e). If you are constantly asking 
"why?" and "how?" questions, you are missing the whole point 
aesthetically. For Wittgenstein, looking for the hows and 
whys prevented us from seeing. 
People who are constantly asking 'why' are like 
tourists who stand in front of a building reading 
Baedeker and are so busy reading the history of its 
construction, etc., that they are prevented from seeing 
the building (1980, 40e). 
The problem seems to be that "an aesthetic explanation 
is not a causal explanation" (Wittgenstein 1972, 18). In 
seeking a causal explanation, you are playing the wrong 
language game, for causal explanations do not play a 
valuable role in the aesthetic language game. Some 
predictability may be possible, but its usefulness is 
severely limited. 
Aesthetic puzzles--puzzles about the effects the 
arts have on us. 
Paradigm of the sciences is mechanics. If people 
imagine a psychology, their ideal is a mechanics of the 
soul ... [but] to talk about a mechanics of the soul is 
slightly funny. 
But we can dream of predicting the reactions of 
human beings, say to works of art. If we imagine the 
dream realized, we'd not thereby have solved what we 
feel to be aesthetic puzzlements, although we may be 
able to predict that a certain line of poetry will, on 
a certain person, act in such and such a way 
(Wittgenstein 1972, 28e). 
Even if we could develop full, complete causal explanations 
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for aesthetic response, we would not be satisfied, because 
this is not the type of explanation sought by those trying 
to solve aesthetic puzzles. 
Supposing it was found that all our judgements 
proceeded from our brain. We discovered particular 
kinds of mechanisms in the brain, formulated general 
laws, etc .... Suppose this were done, it might enable us 
to predict what a particular person would like and 
dislike. We could calculate these things. The question 
is whether this is the sort of explanation we should 
like to have when we are puzzled about aesthetic 
impressions ... Obviously it isn't this, i.e. a 
calculation, an account of reactions, etc., we want 
(Wittgenstein 1972, 20). 
Part of the problem with explanations of the psychological, 
causal sort is that they are likely to be impersonal, an 
examination of the average response of the total number of 
responses that you have studied rather than an examination 
of my response. From the average we could perhaps predict 
the responses of a single person, possibly a type of person, 
or we could predict how most of the people reacted most of 
the time, but this information is not very valuable unless 
you are trying to buy a present for the type of person whose 
probable response can be judged. 
The sort of explanation one is looking for when 
one is puzzled by an aesthetic impression is not a 
causal explanation, not one corroborated by experience 
or by statistics as to how people react. One of the 
curious ... things about psychological experiments is 
that they have to be made on a number of subjects. It 
is the agreement of Smith, Jones and Robinson which 
allows you to give an explanation, e.g. you can try out 
a piece of music in a psychological laboratory and get 
the result that the music acts in such and such a way 
under such and such a drug. This is not what one means 
or what one is driving at by an investigation into 
aesthetics (Wittgenstein 1972, 21) . 
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So, if we are not looking for reasons why, for predictabili-
ty or the average response, what is the point of aesthetic 
explanation? In the aesthetic language game, this question 
is invalid, coming as it does from the outside, from a game 
that requires a point, a goal, a reason why. In some sense, 
just as in a language game that uses causal explanations, 
the goal of explanation is understanding, but aesthetic 
understanding is just as different from scientific under-
standing as aesthetic explanations are different from causal 
explanations. 
Aesthetic Understanding 
Aesthetic Discontent 
How do we know whether a work of art "works" or not? 
What is it that allows us to distinguish between the merely 
proficient artist, the talented artist, and the master? If 
aesthetics were science, there would be concrete criteria by 
which to judge. Anyone with sufficient training would be 
able to recognize and evaluate the level of greatness of a 
given work, and their explanations of why the work was great 
would be thorough and convincing (ideally) . In this case, 
all that would be required for someone to understand art and 
to be able accurately to determine the quality of a piece 
would be the relevant training. But aesthetics is not a 
science, and not everyone is equally talented in the 
recognition and evaluation of artistic quality. 
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Instead, what Wittgenstein thought happened is that in 
evaluating an artwork, a person who is capable of aesthetic 
understanding can have a sense that something is not quite 
right, a feeling that something in the painting or sculpture 
does not quite work. This feeling is what Wittgenstein calls 
aesthetic discomfort. The further ability that allows 
someone to determine and express what it is that is not 
working is aesthetic discontent. 
Perhaps the most important thing in connection 
with aesthetics may be called aesthetic reactions, e.g. 
discontent, disgust, discomfort. The expression of 
discontent is not the same as the expression of discom-
fort. The expression of discontent says: "Make it 
higher ... too low! ... do something to this." 
Is what I call an expression of discontent some-
thing like an expression of discomfort plus knowing the 
cause of the discomfort and asking for it to be re-
moved? (Wittgenstein 1972, 13). 
An analogous, practical example of this would be the nagging 
feeling you get when you know you have forgotton to do 
something. When you leave on vacation and forget to unplug 
the coffeepot, you may have an annoying feeling that 
something is wrong, even if you are not sure about what it 
is. This is analogous to aesthetic discomfort. The 
equivalent of aesthetic discontent would be the realization 
of what it is that was forgotten, and the desire to rectify 
it. 
The primary difference between this more practical form 
of discontent and the aesthetic version is that Wittgenstein 
is uncomfortable with the attempt to break down aesthetic 
discontent into a sensation of discomfort plus a causal 
explanation of why the discomfort exists. To "know the 
cause" of an aesthetic discomfort does not mean the same 
thing for Wittgenstein as it would if it were a scientific 
discussion. 
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Saying 'I know the cause' brings in mind the case 
of statistics or tracing a mechanism. If I say: "I know 
the cause", it looks as if I had analyzed the 
feelings ... which of course, I haven't done ... 
There is a 'Why?' to aesthetic discomfort not a 
'cause' to it. The expression of discomfort takes the 
form of a criticism and not 'My mind is not at rest' or 
something. It might take the form of looking at a 
picture and eying: "What's wrong with it?" 
(Wittgenstein 1972, 14-15). 
When an artistically knowledgeable person looks at an 
artwork, aesthetic discomfort tells them that something is 
wrong, something that prevents them from achieving an 
understanding of the work. There is a failure in 
communication. To analyze this lack of understanding and 
figure out what causes it would not be an aesthetic goal. 
What is desired is the understanding and ability to see the 
artwork in the right way. The failure to do so may be the 
result of either a qualitative lack in the piece, or a 
failure in the viewer's perspective. Confronted with this 
problem, I ask what is wrong that I cannot see correctly. Am 
I looking at it wrong, or is the piece itself the problem? 
If we speak of a 'cause', it is too easy to be misled 
by the family of meanings that the word has. We may start 
looking for explanations, caught up in the 'haws' and the 
'whys', and end up losing sight of the picture itself. When 
we try to alleviate our discontent, we are not pursuing a 
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means to an end. The understanding that is achieved with the 
alleviation of the discontent is what we seek. We want to 
get it 'right', to understand simply for the sake of 
understanding, not in order to "feel" better. "Getting it 
right ... [is] not a means to some further result such as 
producing a certain psychological state in the observer, but 
rather ... 'an end in itself'" (Tilghman, 56). When my 
discomfort is alleviated and my discontent is resolved, I 
know that I understand and that I have finally "gotten it 
right". 
This is a very difficult idea to comprehend. When I 
seek to resolve the feelings of aesthetic discomfort and 
discontent, I do not do this because I want to "feel con-
tent." I am not trying to effect a change in myself as such; 
rather, in "getting it right," in achieving understanding, 
my feelings of discomfort and discontent are alleviated. 
This is not the goal; nor do I seek understanding in order 
to provide an explanation of what I understand. Understand-
ing is of value for itself alone. It gains no added value if 
I try to explain why or how it is valuable. "A poem makes an 
impression on us as we read it ... this takes hold of me, and 
the other not .... 'I experience something different'--And 
what kind of thing?--I can give no satisfactory answer. For 
the answer I give is not what is most important" 
(Wittgenstein 1970, 30e). 
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Aesthetic Explanation 
Although the explanation of what it is that I 
experience when I achieve aesthetic understanding is not 
what is most important, it is still necessary for us to be 
able to communicate some sense of our experience to others. 
We still have the problem of the Tractatus, and our language 
is still inadequate to the task of relating our experience 
in such a way that words alone will allow someone else to 
understand our experience. What we have to do is to enable 
others to have the same experience and to achieve the same 
understanding. 
The problem is that aesthetic understanding is not a 
step-by-step procedure. Aesthetic understanding does not 
require that all the pieces of the puzzle be laid out before 
us, to be put together a piece at a time. It is not as if I 
look at a picture, realize that I am experiencing aesthetic 
discomfort, and analyze the painting and my feeling in order 
to rid myself of this unpleasant sensation. It is much more 
intuitive than that. In trying to explain these things, we 
describe them at length as if they occurred over a period of 
time, and as if each occurred separately and distinctly from 
the others. First, looking; then sensation; then decision; 
then resolution. But instead, there is just one 'event'. The 
whole non-process is aesthetic understanding, which is 
beyond the realm of logic. There is no halfway point 
between understanding and its lack. 
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... if I hear a tune with understanding, doesn't 
something special go on in me--which does not go on if 
I hear it without understanding? And w.hat--No answer 
comes; or anything that occurs to me is insipid. I may 
indeed say: "Now I've understood it," and perhaps talk 
about it, play, compare it with others, etc. Signs of 
understanding may accompany hearing. 
It is wrong to call understanding a process that 
accompanies hearing (Wittgenstein 1967, 29e}. 
Here Wittgenstein specifically denies that aesthetic 
understanding is a process; it is not something that happens 
inside you as you listen nor a sensation that you feel apart 
from the music you hear. It is not an experience that is 
separate from the experience of listening to a piece of 
music or seeing a painting. "If a theme, a phrase, suddenly 
means something to you, you don't have to be able to explain 
it. Just this gesture has been made accessible to you" 
(Wittgenstein 1970, 28e}. Here again we have the influence 
of the primitive language. Not only do we demonstrate our 
understanding through gestures and expressions, art itself 
is gestures and expression. Great art is complete expres-
sion; it communicates directly to us and we understand. We 
don't have to think about it, analyze it, try and figure out 
why or how we understand it, we simply know that we do. 
Wittgenstein described his own experience with this 
sudden comprehension and its effect on him while reading the 
work of the poet Klopstock: 
I had read this kind of stuff and been moderately 
bored, but when I read it in this particular way, 
intensely, I smiled, said: "This is grand," etc. But I 
might not have said anything. The important fact was 
that I read it again and again. When I read these poems 
I made gestures and facial expressions which were what 
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would be called gestures of approval. But the important 
thing was that I read the poems entirely differently, 
more intensely and said to others: "Look! This is how 
they should be read." Aesthetic adjectives played no 
role (Wittgenstein 1972, 4-5). 
Once he "gets it", there is nothing further he can say to 
explain or convince others. He must show them, and then must 
wait and see whether they "get it." 
But how can we know that we have gotten it? If it is 
not something that goes on inside us, nothing we can point 
to in order to say, this is how I know, then what do we do? 
According to Wittgenstein, it will 'click'. 
One asks such a question as "What does this remind 
me of?" or one says of piece of music: "This is like 
some sentence, but what sentence is it like." Various 
things are suggested; one thing ... clicks. What does it 
mean, it 'clicks?' Does it do anything you can compare 
to the noise of a click? Is there the ringing of a 
bell, or something comparable? 
It is as though you needed some criterion, namely 
the clicking, to know the right thing has happened 
(Wittgenstein 1972, 19). 
So I have criterion for my own understanding, but how can I 
tell if someone else has gotten it or not? After all, their 
response may be quite different from my own. I may express 
my understanding by movement, but for others their facial 
expressions may suffice, or they may draw a response. Can I 
determine whether or not things click for them? 
I write a sentence. One word isn't the one I need. 
I find the right word. "What is it I want to say? Oh 
yes, that is what I wanted." The answer in these cases 
is the one that satisfied you, e.g. someone says ... : "I 
will tell you what is at the back of your mind: ... " 
"Oh yes, quite so." 
The criterion for it being the one that was in 
your mind is that when I tell you, you agree. (Wittgen-
stein 1972, 18) 
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This type of confirmation seems spurious to our 
scientific mindset, which requires objective, outside 
confirmation. It sounds ludicrous to say that if I show 
someone how something should be read or convey how he should 
listen, my only confirmation that it has worked will be his 
agreement with me that yes, this is how it should be done. 
But for Wittgenstein, this is sufficient. My pupil could of 
course lie, and say he understood when in fact he did not, 
but this would be evident when he tried to demonstrate his 
understanding. You cannot claim complete understanding 
unless you can also demonstrate that understanding in such a 
way that I could agree that you understand. This type of 
special understanding and communication is possible between 
those who have achieved aesthetic understanding. 
What does it consist in to get hold of a tune or a 
piece of poetry. You may read a stanza. I let you all 
read it. Everyone reads it slightly differently. I get 
the definite impression that "None of them has got hold 
of it." Suppose then I read it out to you and say: 
"Look, this is how it ought to be." Then four of you 
read this stanza, no one exactly like the other, but in 
such a way that I say: "Each one is exactly certain of 
himself." This is a phenomenon, being certain of your-
self, reading it in one way only. He is absolutely 
exact as to what pause to make. I would have conveyed 
something to you. I would perfectly correctly say, that 
I have exactly conveyed to you the exact experience I 
had ... This (convention/communication/description) is 
not based on copying me exactly (Wittgenstein 1972, 
40) • 
"This is how it should be read!" If you then understand, you 
will be able to read with understanding. Merely imitating me 
is insufficient. You could exactly duplicate my intonation, 
my pauses and gestures, but this would be mimicry, not 
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understanding. Your understanding will be expressed in your 
own way. It is not sufficient to study previous versions of 
Hamlet, to see how other actors moved. It is necessary to 
become Hamlet, to incorporate the role into yourself, to 
"make your mark." "If I make a gesture, and you are good 
imitators, these gestures will have to be similar, but 
different .... The criterion for its being this gesture will 
be the clicking of it in you" (Wittgenstein 1972, 39). 
Here is how the puzzle pieces fall into place. That "click" 
is the sound of everything fitting together at once, and the 
result is understanding. "Aha!" says our primitive language. 
"I think she's got it!" 
Comparison and Translation 
So how is it that we go about resolving aesthetic 
discomfort and achieving understanding? "What we really 
want, to solve aesthetic puzzlements, is certain compari-
sons, grouping together of certain cases" (Wittgenstein 
1972, 28-29). This comparison is similar to what we did as 
we developed our aesthetic vocabulary. To develop the 
language game of aesthetics, we compared similar cases from 
different language games to our new activities. I see a 
painting, and the feeling I get is similar, if distantly 
removed, from the feeling that a really good cup of coffee 
gives me. Both cause the same gesture, the same expression 
on my face. "Good" begins to have a new and extended family 
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of meanings for me. If I am at a loss for words, I will try 
to think of comparative examples that hopefully will be 
understood. 
One of the most interesting points which the 
question of not being able to describe is connected 
with, the impression which a certain verse or bar in 
music gives you is indescribable ... ! think you would 
say it gives you experiences which can't be 
described .... it is true that again and again we do feel 
inclined to say: "I can't describe my experience" ... "! 
can make a gesture but that's all" ... But that doesn't 
mean that you may not one day say that something is a 
description. You may one day find the word or you find 
a verse that fits it ... And now perhaps you say "And now 
I understand it." (Wittgenstein 1972, 39) 
Aesthetic understanding can be achieved by comparison. 
This is simply an extension of the idea that different 
things (like the ice cream and the friend's voice, p.13) may 
make me feel a similar way. So, a picture can serve to 
illustrate a movement of a symphony, or a poem to describe a 
painting in a way that lets you to see it in a way that was 
not possible before. 
These comparisons aid your understanding because 
something within the one resembles something within the 
other such that each can serve to illustrate the other and 
make it more clear. "Aesthetics is descriptive. What it does 
is to draw one's attention to certain features, to place 
things side by side so as to exhibit these features." 
(Wittgenstein 1979, 38) An example that Wittgenstein uses is 
the comparison of music to language. "One says 'Don't you 
see, this is as if a conclusion were being drawn' or 'This 
is as it were a parenthesis', etc." (Wittgenstein 1958, 143) 
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The rhythms of music are compared to the rhythms of language 
in the hope that greater understanding will result. Although 
we cannot say what music means, we can make it more 
understandable. "In music there is both meaning and logical 
sequence, but in a musical sense; it is a language we speak 
and understand, but which we are unable to translate" 
[Eduard Hanslick in The Beautiful in Music] (Tilghman, 69-
70). This is a statement that I think Wittgenstein could 
agree with, at least insofar as he would agree that we 
cannot translate the language of art into rational verbal 
discourse. However, perhaps we can "translate" from one 
medium to another, from a picture of words to a picture of 
music, and so on. It would not be an exact translation, but 
translations very seldom are. They are always also 
interpretations. 
We speak of understanding a sentence in the sense 
in which it can be replaced by another which says the 
same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be 
replaced by any other. (Any more than one musical theme 
can be replaced by another.) 
In the one case the thought in the sentence is 
something common to different sentences; in the other, 
something that is expressed only by these words in 
these positions (Wittgenstein 1958, 143). 
Sometimes when I say things "in other words", I still 
manage to get the same sense across. Perhaps in these cases 
there is no meaning exclusive to the particular words I use, 
embedded in them such that it would be lost in the "other 
words". On the other hand, if it is a case of "something 
that is expressed only by these words in these positions", 
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understanding to someone else, I can go no further than 
laying my "evidence", my comparisons, before them. I cannot 
prove that I am right. Either understanding is achieved, or 
it is not. Hopefully, things "click." 
CHAPTER 4 
AESTHETIC EVALUATION 
Aesthetic Rules 
Rules; Their Nature and PukPose 
Comparison alone is insufficient to convey 
understanding. Another useful tool is critical evaluation. 
Despite Wittgenstein's rejection of anything resembling a 
Science of Aesthetics, he still acknowledges that there are 
certain criteria that are useful in evaluating art. These 
rules do not define what is important and meaningful about 
art, but they do help in gaining understanding of what is 
important and meaningful. Ian MacKenzie describes the role 
of rules as follows; 
... The understanding and interpretation of a work of 
art requires more than the finding of counterparts .... 
The analysis of an individual work of art is usually a 
formal one. Understanding words, sounds, or images 
requires the perception of formal patterns. Criticism -
getting someone "to see what you see" - begins with the 
description of formal elements. The choice of what to 
describe is at the same time an act of interpretation 
and evaluation (MacKenzie, 97). 
These formal criteria are not intended to make it possible 
to talk about the "content" of aesthetic understanding. 
However, the description and criticism that is possible 
plays a specific and necessary role. It also is a form of 
comparison from which we can learn. Instead of comparing two 
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different mediums, as described in chapter three (p. 32-36), 
aesthetic criticism compares an artistic work to an ideal or 
established standard. This standard serves as a measuring 
device, a basis from which to judge the excellence or lack 
thereof of the artwork under consideration. 
What makes something an ideal? Many of the criteria 
come from context and history. 
Why do we say certain changes bring a thing nearer 
to an ideal, e.g., making a door lower, or the bass in 
music quieter. It is not that we want in different 
cases to produce the same effect, namely, an agreeable 
feeling. What made the ideal Greek profile into an 
ideal, what quality? Actually what made us say it is 
the ideal is a certain very complicated role it played 
in the life of people. For example, the greatest sculp-
tors used this form, people were taught it, Aristotle 
wrote on it ... The various arts have some analogy to 
each other, and it might be said that the element 
common to them is the ideal. But this is not the 
meaning of "the ideal". The ideal is got from a 
specific game, and can only be explained in some spe-
cific connection, e.g., Greek sculpture. There is no 
way of saying what all have in common ... in the 
statement that their beauty is what approaches the 
ideal, the word "ideal" is not used as is the word 
"water", which stands for something that can be pointed 
to. And no aesthetic investigation will supply you with 
a meaning of the word "ideal" which you did not have 
before. 
When one describes changes made in a musical 
arrangement as being directed to bringing the arrange-
ment of parts nearer to an ideal, the ideal is not 
before us like a straight line which is set before us 
when we try to draw it ... It may happen that you 
have a picture in mind ... but this is rare (Wittgenstein 
1979, 36-37). 
The ideal is not concrete, not something held up before 
us to which we literally compare our object in order to 
determine what is lacking. In a way, the ideal is a type of 
consensus, not so much a conscious image of a people and 
time, but a standard which has developed through time and 
become accepted as the standard. This is not absolute 
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conformity to a common measure. Instead, the ideal points us 
in the right direction without telling us how far to go. We 
go along in that direction, and we know that we have arrived 
when we are in the right place. It clicks. What we have to 
guard against is the too zealous enforcement of the ideal, 
so that the standard becomes a tyrant rather than a tour 
guide. 
The only way for us to guard our assertions 
against distortion - or avoid vacuity in our asser-
tions, is to have a clear view in our reflections of 
what the ideal is, namely an object of comparison - a 
yardstick, as it were - instead of making a prejudice 
of it to which everything bas to conform (Wittgenstein 
1980, 26e) 
Here, Wittgenstein is speaking more specifically of the 
distortion that afflicts philosophy when it becomes dogmatic 
in defense of its chosen paradigms, but the concept works 
equally well in aesthetics. If we enthrone a paradigm, 
making it the ideal to which all else must conform or be 
lacking, we stifle imagination and creativity, both of which 
are essential to art. Instead, the paradigm should be a 
marker, a measuring stick with which to compare the object 
of study. Again, the ideal is not an image held before us, 
but something more pervasive in the whole language game of 
aesthetics. 
"The repeat is necessary." In what respect is it 
necessary? Well, sing it, and you will see that only 
the repeat gives it its tremendous power. - Don't we 
have an impression that a model for this theme already 
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exists in reality and the theme only approaches it, 
corresponds to it, if this section is repeated? ... Yet 
there is no paradigm apart from the theme itself. And 
yet again there is a paradigm apart from the theme: 
namely, the rhythm of our language, of our thinking and 
feeling. And the theme, moreover, is a new part of our 
language; it becomes incorporated into it; we learn a 
new gesture (Wittgenstein 1980, 52e). 
In one sense, the theme is nothing but itself. It is not 
the imitation of the ideal. We do not experiment on our 
music and paintings to make them all conform to the same set 
of standards. However, there is a sense in which the very 
rhythms of our language, feelings, thought, and so of our 
very lives are ideals or paradigms for artistic creation. 
What is necessary is an understanding of the models and 
the rules that are used to apply such paradigms. 
Suppose that a Russian who doesn't know English is 
overwhelmed by a sonnet admitted to be good. We would 
say that he does not know what is in it at all. 
Similarly, of a person who doesn't know metres but who 
is overwhelmed, we would say that he doesn't know 
what's in it. In music this is more pronounced. Suppose 
there is a person who admires and enjoys what is admit-
ted to be good but can't remember the simplest tunes, 
doesn't know when the bass comes in. we say he hasn't 
seen what's in it. We use the phrase 'A man is musical' 
not so as to call a man musical if he says "Ah!" when a 
piece of music is played, any more than we call a dog 
musical if it wags its tail when music is played 
(Wittgenstein 1972, 6). 
The individuals in this case have no training, no critical 
faculty to enable them to make an aesthetic judgment. They 
are the people who say, "I don't know art, but I know what I 
like!" They are simply overwhelmed, caught perhaps by that 
boundary between what can be spoken and what can only be 
shown. Restricted to the primitive language game of emotive 
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gestures and exaggerated facial expressions, they are unable 
to find adequate words to go beyond their simple yet sincere 
admiration. They are not capable of aesthetic appreciation 
in any complex sense. 
What does appreciation consist in? If a man goes 
through an endless number of patterns in a tailors', 
says: "No, this is slightly too dark. This is slightly 
too loud", etc., he is what we call an appreciator of 
material. That he is an appreciator is not shown by the 
interjections he uses, but by the way he chooses, 
selects, etc. Similarly in music: "Does this harmonize? 
No. The bass is not quite loud enough. I just want 
something different ... (Wittgenstein 1972, 7). 
The appreciator has a standard for comparison, an idea of 
what is correct, of what will work. We recognize her by her 
manner and sophistication (in aesthetic terms), by the way 
in which she proceeds. She has experience, she knows her way 
around and has learned something of her field. 
Jay Shir objects to the way in which Wittgenstein 
advocates this type of criticism in aesthetics, feeling that 
this is a misunderstanding on Wittgenstein's part: 
To express aesthetic discomfort by saying, for 
example, that a contorted pose is 'wrong' in a Quattro-
centro picture shows only that the speaker has learnt 
something about the conventions of Quattrocentro paint-
ing ... It does not necessarily show that the speaker has 
learnt anything about what art is or how to evaluate 
fully (Shir, 10). 
Shir is absolutely correct. Mere facility with the 
forms of a particular genre does not prove that the critic 
"has learnt anything about what art is". However, he is 
attacking Wittgenstein unfairly. Wittgenstein is not 
concerned with "what art is", because that is a question 
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more appropriate to a different language game. It is true 
that just the one example given would be insufficient to 
prove that the individual in question was capable of 
complete aesthetic evaluation and interpretation. You would 
have to observe how she proceeded over a period of time to 
see if her judgments were correct and if she were capable of 
conveying understanding and critical appreciation to her 
audience. Nowhere does Wittgenstein claim that mere 
apprehension of the technical aspects of different genres is 
sufficient to lay a claim to aesthetic judgment. As will be 
shown, this claim must be backed by experience, training and 
perhaps something more. 
As mentioned in chapter two, the nature of the 
aesthetic vocabulary is more normative than descriptive. 
When using comparisons in the demonstration of critical 
judgment, terms of critical comparison are heard more often, 
and are more effective than uncritical terms of admiration. 
It is remarkable that in real life, when aesthetic 
judgements are made, aesthetic adjectives such as 
'beautiful', 'fine', etc., play hardly any role at all. 
Are aesthetic adjectives used in music criticism? You 
say "Look at this transition," or ... "The passage here 
is incoherent." Or you say, in a poetical criticism, 
"His use of images is precise." The words you use are 
more akin to 'right' and 'correct' (as these words are 
used in ordinary speech) than to 'beautiful' and 
'lovely' (Wittgenstein 1972, 3). 
The appeals here are to standards of coherency, 
precision, etc., that are being used well/misused. Clearly, 
this type of criticism is more conducive to making a 
judgment than simply saying "The passage here is lovely, or 
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"His images are disgusting." Correctness in aesthetic 
judgment is an appeal to standards, the standards we invoke 
when we say things like, "That doesn't sound right". 
[Rhees: What rule are we using or referring to 
when we say: "This is the correct way"? If a music 
teacher says a piece should be played this way and 
plays it, what is he appealing to?] 
Take the question: "How should poetry be read? 
What is the correct way of reading it?" If you are 
talking about blank verse the right way of reading it 
might be stressing it correctly--you discuss how far 
you should stress the rhythm and how far you should 
hide it. A man says it ought to be read this way and 
reads it out to you. You say: "Oh yes. Now it makes 
sense." (Wittgenstein 1972, 4). 
Here, an element that seems almost intuitive is 
present. Obviously, there are certain accepted rules or 
guidelines concerning poetry: technicalities of meter and 
rhyme scheme with traditional verse, rhythms of language and 
effect with other forms. But beyond those is the "clicking," 
the understanding as it encompasses us. 
This is not to say that the rules are unnecessary. It 
is our rules and conventions that allow us to be understood 
by others. Wittgenstein denied the possibility of a private 
language, in part because it would violate the boundaries of 
the language game itself. In the same way, there are no 
private meanings or private rules. Rules are rules by virtue 
of their being accepted as rules. You can have a personal 
code of behavior, or a private set of standards, but these 
cannot be used as standards in a public discussion without 
acceptance by all concerned, or there will be no common 
basis or possibility of comparison. Aesthetics assumes such 
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a common basis. It assumes a common language game that 
provides a common or at least comparable set of criteria and 
meanings, with a possibility of understanding arising from a 
common context. This common context is the source of 
aesthetic rules. 
The Source of Rules 
In order to develop aesthetic judgment, you must first 
learn the rules that guide that judgment. Although these 
rules may vary depending on the artistic form, style or 
period, and they may be more or less explicit, they develop 
and are learned in a similar manner. 
In the case of the word 'correct' you have a 
variety of related cases. There is first the case in 
which you learn the rules. The cutter learns how long a 
coat is to be, how wide the sleeve must be, etc. He 
learns rules - he is drilled - as in music you are 
drilled in harmony and counterpoint (Wittgenstein 1972, 
5) 
A preliminary step in acquiring discerning aesthetic 
judgment is to learn the rules. This may be accomplished by 
either a formal course of study, or by personal 
experimentation. For example, to learn to play music 
correctly, you may study harmony, counterpoint and other 
musical elements. Similarly, as you learn to paint you study 
the effects of light and color, perspective, and so on. 
Often, you study the history of music and art to gain in 
experience and knowledge. In any case, the rules must be 
learned, and we learn them from our society and culture. 
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You could regard the rules laid down for the 
measurement of a coat as an expression of what certain 
people want ... (These may be extremely explicit and 
taught, or not formulated at all- footnote) ... People 
separated on the point of what a coat should measure: 
there were some who didn't care if it was broad or 
narrow, etc.; there were others who cared an enormous 
lot. The rules of harmony, you can say, expressed the 
way people wanted chords to follow--their wishes 
crystallized in these rules .... All the greatest 
composers wrote in accordance with them. You can say 
that every composer changed the rules, but the 
variation was very slight; not all the rules were 
changed. The music was still good by a great many of 
the old rules (Wittgenstein 1972, 5-6). 
Rules developed as a matter of custom. As people made their 
wishes known in the choices they made, these became the 
conventions that were used to measure the correctness of 
adherence to the rules. 
As styles change, so do the rules. Someone innovates or 
proposes a twist on current accepted practice. If it is 
successful, perhaps it becomes the new standard. If it is 
not successful, it dies a quiet, unlamented death (Black 
velvet "paintings", for instance). These standards permeate 
the culture, affecting all of the artistic disciplines. "To 
describe a set of aesthetic rules fully means really to 
describe the culture of a period" (Wittgenstein 1972, 8). If 
you look back through history, the way in which we designate 
time periods often has a great deal to do with their 
aesthetic standards. The Classical period; the Renaissance 
period; the Romantic; the Modern; the Post-Modern. Each of 
these brings to mind characteristic styles of music, 
painting, and culture in general. These styles vary by time 
period and country, as the cultural context shifts. Yet we 
come to expect a certain amount of artistic continuity 
throughout music, literature, the graphic, plastic and 
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performing arts. All of them are guided to one degree or 
another by the standards that have developed in the culture 
around them. 
Aesthetic Judgment 
The Development of Mastery 
As Shir pointed out, it is not sufficient to merely 
attain technical proficiency in applying the cultural stand-
ards that you are working with. It is possible to have a 
person who knows all of the rules, and yet who has poor 
aesthetic judgment. Perhaps they cannot apply the rules 
consistently; or maybe they can, but it is still apparent 
that they have no aesthetic understanding because they 
cannot bring anyone else to understanding. They are not able 
to make us "see it like this." To do all of this: learn the 
rules, apply them correctly and with understanding, and 
convey this understanding; this requires the development of 
aesthetic judgment. 
In what we call the Arts a person who has judge-
ment develops. When we make an aesthetic judgement 
about a thing, we do not just gape at it and say: "Oh! 
How marvellous!" We distinguish between a person who 
knows what he is talking about and a person who doesn't 
(Wittgenstein 1972, 6). 
The person "who knows what he is talking about" has experi-
ence. He knows a great deal and can apply it consistently 
over time, not just once or twice. This person has had his 
judgment refined over time. " ... If I hadn't learned the 
rules, I wouldn't be able to make the aesthetic judgement. 
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In learning the rules you get a more and more refined judge-
ment. Learning the rules actually changes your judgement" 
(Wittgenstein 1972, 5). As you learn more, you gain a better 
perception, a surer eye for aesthetic value, and your 
judgment becomes measurably better and more trustworthy. 
This mastery distinguishes you from others who lack it. 
It demonstrates not only that you have a greater ability to 
make valuable aesthetic judgments, but to express them. You 
are not confined to the primitive language game like those 
who "just gape ... and say: 'Oh! How marvellous!.'" This is 
why the word 'lovely' is seldom used in the aesthetic 
language game. "A lot of people, of course, who can't 
express themselves properly use the word very frequently. As 
they use it, it is used as an interjection" (Wittgenstein 
1972, 3). These are people without training, without the 
ability to make perceptive aesthetic judgments. They are 
restricted to exclamations and interjections. 
The master, on the other hand, develops an intuition in 
the application of the rules. She dictates the rules, rather 
than the rules dictating to her. 
Suppose I went in for tailoring and I first learnt 
all the rules, I might have, on the whole, two sorts of 
attitudes. (1) Lewy says: "This is too short." I say 
"No. It is right. It is according to the rules." (2) I 
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develop a feeling for the rules. I interpret the rules. 
I might say "No. It isn't right. It isn't according to 
the rules." Here I would be making an aesthetic judge-
ment about the thing which is according to the rules in 
sense {1) {Wittgenstein 1972, 5). 
In the first case, the impression is of someone who holds 
the rules up as the absolute measure. In the second, the 
judge has learned the rules so well that they have become 
guidelines rather than rules written in stone. He has a 
facility with them that the first person is lacking. They 
direct his behavior and his judgments, but they do not 
dictate them. This is the type of judge capable of making us 
see things differently. He can provide the comparisons that 
will widen our perception. He can show us that if we can 
just "see it like this", we too shall understand. 
Sometimes we do not understand simply because we are 
not seeing things in the right way. Our perspective is wrong 
or inadequate. 
Here it occurs to me that in conversation on 
aesthetic matters we use the words: "You have to see it 
like this, this is how it is meant"; When you see it 
like this, you see where it goes wrong"; "You have to 
hear this bar as an intro"; "You must hear it in this 
key"; "You must phrase it like this"; {which can refer 
to hearing as well as to playing) (Wittgenstein 1958, 
202e) . 
In order for me to see things differently, I have to gain a 
different perspective and be taken out of my normal way of 
seeing things. Perhaps I am unfamiliar with the standards 
that are applied, or the context against which the piece is 
performed. "'Now he's seeing it like this,' 'now like that' 
would only be said of someone capable of making certain 
49 
applications of the figure quite freely. The substratum of 
this experience is the mastery of a techniquen (Wittgenstein 
1958, 208e). 
Benjamin Tilghman stresses this idea strongly: 
What underlies the very possibility of being able 
to see things in the right way and even the possibility 
of making such comparisons is what Wittgenstein calls 
the mastery of a technique. The technique required to 
see the ambiguous figure as a duck is familiarity with 
that kind of creature and the prior ability to identify 
and describe ducks. Likewise the technique required to 
get the point of what Fry is showing us about Cezanne 
[in an artistic comparison] is some measure of famil-
iarity with painting and its history and traditions. If 
the relevant background is absent, there can be no 
experience of seeing things and responding to them in 
the right way. The ability to see things in appropriate 
ways depends upon the mastery of techniques that derive 
from the proper background. In the case of understand-
ing and appreciating art this background has to be the 
greater part of our entire cultural background (Tilgh-
man, 136) . 
Here you have a concise summary of the case. Rules, context, 
judgment, response, all must be present in the right way for 
a mastery of aesthetic judgment to develop. Our language is 
a development of who we are and how we live. nTo understand 
a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a 
language means to be master of a technique" (Wittgenstein 
958, 81e) . 
If I understand the aesthetic language game, then I 
have achieved mastery in this area. But this mastery is not 
just a technique, not just a matter of study, of memorizing 
rules, familiarizing yourself with proportions, harmonies, 
perspectives, rhyme schemes, etc., but also a matter of 
innate talent, a use of intuition for discernment. 
so 
When one shows someone the king in chess and says: 
"This is the king," this does not tell him the use of 
this piece--unless he already knows the rules of the 
game ... You could imagine having learnt the rules of the 
game without ever having been shewn an actual piece ... 
One can also imagine someone's having learnt the 
game without ever learning or formulating rules ... He 
too might be given the explanation ... This explanation 
again only tells him the use of the piece because ... the 
place for it was already prepared .... And in this case 
it is so, not because the person to whom we give the 
explanation already knows rules, but because in another 
sense he is already master of a game (Wittgenstein 
1958, lSe). 
The first individual has studied and learned the rules, 
even though he has not yet been exposed to the objects of 
the game. When presented with the pieces, he understands 
their roles. It all fits. The second individual has learned 
the game as well, but more intuitively. She knows how the 
pieces move and how the objects fit without analysis. She 
"knows" the rules, even if they have not been spelled out. 
She has seen how the pieces are moved and has developed a 
"feel" for them. She has been immersed in the game, 
developed a skill that extends beyond the technical 
knowledge and proficiency of the first player. 
Even without working "by the book", this mastery can be 
tested and checked up on by others. And what are the 
criteria that prove mastery? One, of course, is the ability 
to make right judgments consistently. Another is a manner of 
behavior. 
There is a certain expression proper to the appre-
ciation of music, in listening, playing, and at other 
times. too. Sometimes gestures form part of this ex-
pression, but sometimes it will just be a matter of how 
a man plays, or hums, the piece, now and again of the 
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comparisons he draws and the images with which he as it 
were illustrates the music. Someone who understands 
music will listen differently, from someone who does 
not. But he will show that he understands a particular 
theme not just in manifestations that accompany his 
hearing or playing that theme but in his understanding 
for music in general (Wittgenstein 1980, 70e). 
This understanding arises from a person's familiarity with 
the history and culture that is required for mastery. Such 
things can be taught. We have spoken of being "drilled" in 
the rules and the study of history and culture. But if there 
is something more intuitive to the nature of mastery, is 
this something that can also be taught? 
The Transmissibility of MaStekY 
If aesthetic judgment is transmittable, this must mean 
more than just educating a person in art history and the 
artistic context, and familiarizing them with the various 
conventions surrounding the different artistic mediums. Mere 
technical proficiency is insufficient to demonstrate 
aesthetic mastery. The accurate transmission of mastery 
would have to include the ability to bring others to 
aesthetic understanding and to inculcate in them the ability 
to achieve this understanding themselves. Wittgenstein 
implies that this type of understanding can be taught: 
So how do we explain to someone what "understand-
ing music" means? By specifying the images, kinaesthet-
ic sensation, etc., experienced by someone who under-
stands? More likely, by drawing attention to his ex-
pressive movements.--And we really ought to ask ... what 
it means to speak of: understanding what it means to 
understand music. For some would say: to understand 
that means: to understand music itself. And in that 
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case we should have to ask "Well, can someone be taught 
to understand music?", for that is the only sort of 
teaching that could be called explaining music. {Witt-
genstein 1980, 70e). 
If one can teach someone to understand music or some 
other art form, then this, along with the knowledge of 
context and culture, would count as the transmissibility of 
mastery. 
As indicated, there are varying degrees of mastery, 
depending on technical proficiency, knowledge, experience 
and ability to apply all of this successfully and 
consistently. Some of these things can be taught, some 
require the passage of time and diligence of application. In 
the following passage, Wittgenstein speaks specifically of 
the ability to determine genuineness of expressions of 
feeling, but the concepts should apply equally well to 
mastery of aesthetic judgments. 
Is there such a thing as 'expert judgement' ... ? 
Even here, there are those whose judgement is 'better' 
and those whose judgement is 'worse.' 
Correcter prognoses will generally issue from the 
judgements of those with better knowledge of mankind. 
Can one learn this knowledge? Yes: some can. Not, 
however, by taking a course in it, but through 'experi-
ence' .--Can someone else be a man's teacher in this? 
Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right 
tip. This is what 'learning' and 'teaching' are like 
here.--What one acquires here is not a technique; one 
learns correct judgements. There are also rules, but 
they do not form a system, and only experienced people 
can apply them right {Wittgenstein 1958, 227e). 
This is more like apprenticeship than the forms of education 
to which we are accustomed, and not everyone can learn the 
making of correct judgments. It is exposure to the medium, 
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to the contexts in which the rules are applied and the 
judgments made that brings you the knowledge and experience 
necessary to becoming a master yourself. 'Teaching' is an 
interactive experience, not the passive acquiring of 
information. Correct aesthetic judgments require 
understanding, and this understanding is not gained simply 
from information. It also requires a certain intuition or 
'inspiration' which is much more difficult to transmit. If I 
can communicate the way I listen for inspiration, I can 
communicate mastery as well. 
Let us imagine a rule intimating to me which way I 
am to obey it; that is, as my eye travels along the 
line, a voice within me says: "This way!"--What is the 
difference between this process of obeying a kind of 
inspiration and that of obeying a rule? ... In the case 
of inspiration I await direction. I shall not be able 
to teach anyone else my 'technique' of following the 
line. Unless, indeed, I teach him some way of 
hearkening, some kind of receptivity ... (Wittgenstein 
1958, 87e). 
To "teach" such receptivity consists in providing 
experiences, in giving "tips" as to how the pupil might 
proceed. It is like any mystical experience. I can tell you 
what I did, how I felt and how I opened myself to it, but 
the same path may not work for you. 
The Aesthetic Context 
To a certain extent, an artwork is defined by its 
context, but this is not always only the context in which it 
was created. Some artworks continue to maintain their value 
as art well past their time of origin. Other objects become 
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dated when they outlive the customs and conventions of their 
period of origin, while still others develop greater impact 
as time passes (only in retrospect can something be 
designated as "ahead of its time"). Those works that are 
valued as art works beyond their time of conception seem to 
transcend their local origins. This might indicate that some 
of the rules and conventions surrounding art are not 
temporally conditioned. Styles may change, but some works 
remain artistically valuable and meaningful even after the 
conventions and ideas that provoked them have passed, and 
some even gain in value. Shakespeare's works are arguably 
more valued as art today than they were when written, when 
they served as entertainment for the masses. 
Even so, it is often necessary to examine an artwork's 
context of origin in order to achieve full aesthetic 
understanding. Only from that perspective does it have its 
full impact. It may seem out of place and peculiar until we 
are familiar with its origins. "It is not only difficult to 
describe what appreciation consists in, but impossible. To 
describe what it consists in we would have to describe the 
whole environment" (Wittgenstein 1972, 7). An art object is 
exhibited and appreciated best against the background of its 
environment. Every art object and every person is already in 
an aesthetic context--whether they are aware of it or not. 
This is demonstrated in a somewhat simplistic way if we 
just look at how musical tastes change. This happens rather 
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rapidly. My mother listens to classical and big band music, 
my brother listens to early rock and roll, and my nephew 
listens to heavy metal. Their aesthetic contexts are 
different, and their tastes have been developed and 
cultivated by different standards. These tastes can overlap, 
as when you are exposed to a variety of contexts, spanning 
from classical to new age, blues, and so on. You may not 
appreciate them all equally, and it takes a certain 
familiarity to appreciate them at all. "There are, for 
example, styles of painting which do not convey anything to 
me in this immediate way, but do to other people. I think 
custom and upbringing have a hand in this" (Wittgenstein 
1958, 201e). 
This difference of contexts can be physical, mental or 
temporal. 
You talk in entirely different terms of the Coro-
nation robe of Edward II and of a dress suit. What did 
they do and say about Coronation robes? ... Questions 
like 'What standards were there?', etc. are all rele-
vant to the question 'Could you criticize the robe as 
they criticized it?' You appreciate it in an entirely 
different way; your attitude to it is entirely differ-
ent to that of a person living at the time it was 
designed. On the other hand, 'This is a fine Coronation 
robe!' might have been said by a man at the time in 
exactly the same way as a man says it now (Wittgenstein 
1972, 9). 
The Coronation robe will not have the same meaning now as it 
did at the time it was made. On the other hand, the exclama-
tions that it inspires in the untrained may be exactly the 
same. i.e., "Isn't that marvelous!". 
The aesthetic appreciation and understanding of an 
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object is dependent not only on the context of the viewer, 
but on the context of the work. We look at a contemporary 
work differently than an historical work, perhaps depending 
on whether it is in use or not. The Coronation robe was 
created as a useful object as well as an artistic one. Now 
its context is primarily if not entirely that of an art 
object or a museum piece. This will change its context. This 
is also exemplified in the "world" of antiques. Something 
that was originally created for purely utilitarian purposes 
will over time become something purely decorative, valuable 
for its age, its authenticity, its "quaintness", rather than 
its usefulness. In this sense we cannot appreciate the art 
of a different time or culture exactly as someone from that 
context would. We are always already in our own context. 
One reason why authors become dated, even though 
they once amounted to something, is that their writ-
ings, when reinforced by their contemporary setting, 
speak strongly to men, whereas without this reinforce-
ment their works die, as if bereft of the illumination 
that gave them their colour (Wittgenstein 1980, 79e). 
Deprived of context, some works suffer. They no longer carry 
the weight and influence that they had. This may be because 
of their topicality, which does not extend meaningfully 
beyond the time of the event. 
On the other hand, it is also sometimes possible for 
old styles to be renewed. It will not be exactly the same, 
but something in the old style that spoke will speak again. 
An old style can be translated, as it were, into a 
newer language; it can, one might say, be performed 
afresh at a tempo appropriate to our own times. To do 
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this is really only to reproduce ... 
But what I mean is not giving an old style a fresh 
trim. You don't take the old forms and fix them up to 
suit the latest taste. No, you are really speaking the 
old language, perhaps without realizing it, but you are 
speaking it in a way that is appropriate to the modern 
world, without on that account necessarily being in 
accordance with its taste (Wittgenstein 1980, 60e}. 
This is not merely taking an old style and dressing it up 
with a few modern twists. This is taking something that is 
true, and saying the same thing, but in a way that it can be 
heard again as if it were new. Sometimes we just see things 
as hopelessly old and outdated, when they still have some-
thing to tell us. Sometimes this is recognized, and a "new 
translation" is developed. 
In saying "When I heard this word, it meant .•. to 
me" one refers to a point of time and to a way of using 
the word. (Of course, it is this combination that we 
fail to grasp} ... 
I speak of the essential references of the utter-
ance in order to distinguish them from other peculiari-
ties of the expression we use. The references that are 
essential to an utterance are the ones which would make 
us translate some otherwise alien form of expression 
into this, our customary form (Wittgenstein 1958, 
17Se) . 
These "essential references" speak to us in such a way 
that we enter into the aesthetic language game, 
"translating" by comparison and evaluation. If we listen to 
a song, and it reminds us of a picture we have seen, these 
essential references are what the two pieces have in common. 
One is in notes, one in colors, so that the accidents are 
different, but the essence is shared. This is what lets us 
recognize the value of the object under consideration. Not 
every piece of writing gets translated into our own tongue, 
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because some of it is not worth the time and effort. 
Something must be used to judge when it is worth it, both 
for words and other artistic mediums. 
Further evidence of the intrinsically joined nature of 
aesthetics and its context is shown in the following pas-
sage. Just as the learning of rules refines aesthetic per-
ception and judgment, so the rules refine and define the 
culture that develops them, and these rules are not always 
transmissible. 
The words we call expressions of aesthetic judge-
ment play a very complicated role ... in what we call a 
culture of a period. To describe their use or to 
describe what you mean by a cultured taste, you have to 
describe a culture. What we now call a cultured taste 
perhaps didn't exist in the Middle Ages. An entirely 
different game is played in different ages (Wittgen-
stein 1972, 8). 
As rules change, as the context changes, the game changes as 
well. The Coronation robe participates in a different game 
now than before. What is most important to see here is that 
the context is inextricably important for aesthetic under-
standing: 
For how can it be explained what 'expressive 
playing' is? Certainly not by anything that accompanies 
the playing.--What is needed for the explanation? One 
might say: a culture.--If someone is brought up in a 
particular culture, and then reacts to music in such-
and-such a way, you can teach him the use of the phrase 
"expressive playing" (Wittgenstein 1967, 29e). 
Coming from a particular culture gives you an insight into 
that culture. Certain faculties can be developed in the 
context of rules and conventions of that culture that affect 
your aesthetic perceptions. One of these faculties is 'taste.' 
Taste and Genius 
It is unclear what role taste plays in aesthetic mas-
tery, or whether or not taste refers to aesthetic mastery. 
Both come from knowledge of the context. In his article 
"Geniuses and Metaphors," Yuval Lurie draws a connection 
between the two in that, like aesthetic mastery, aesthetic 
judgment is one of the faculties that leads to taste. 
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Taste, according to Wittgenstein, is a culturally 
acquired faculty; one which comes about through the 
acquisition of refined skills and through the cultiva-
tion of aesthetic sensibilities, judgements and atti-
tudes. It is a faculty which supports tradition and 
which, in turn, is manifested in the social circum-
stances in which tradition is expressed (Lurie, 226). 
Taste is acquired from the aesthetic context, and serves in 
turn to support and preserve the aesthetic conditions. There 
is no distinction made here between good taste and poor 
taste. Presumably, if one has taste, it is good taste; what 
might be called poor taste is in fact no taste at all. 
However there are different levels of aesthetic taste 
corresponding to different levels of aesthetic appreciation. 
There are lots of people, well-offish, who have 
been to good schools, who can afford to travel about 
and see the Louvre, etc., and who know a lot about and 
can talk fluently about dozens of painters. There is 
another person who has seen very few paintings, but who 
looks intensely at one or two paintings which make a 
profound impression on him. Another person who is 
broad, neither deep nor wide. Another person who is 
narrow, concentrated and circumscribed. Are these all 
different kinds of appreciation? They may all be called 
'appreciation' (Wittgenstein 1972, 9). 
These are persons of taste, some with a better de-
veloped sense of taste and hence of appreciation. It is 
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unclear in this passage which have the better taste, and not 
at all clear that any of these express aesthetic mastery. 
They have different levels of experience and exposure to the 
aesthetic culture, but none of them have what Wittgenstein 
called 'cultured taste' (cf. above, p. 58}. 
There is a connection between aesthetic judgment and 
cultured taste. Tastes may vary, as does the quality of 
aesthetic judgments, and a 'cultured' taste is equal to aes-
thetic mastery. Such a faculty would seem most useful in an 
evaluative situation, such as that of an art critic. In the 
actual creation of art, it could serve to refine a piece, 
but there aesthetic mastery or cultured taste by itself is 
limited in its creative usefulness. Taste is not capable of 
moving forward and breaking new ground. It can guide 
aesthetic judgments and help us to remove aesthetic 
discomfort and achieve understanding, but it does not create 
anything new. 
The faculty of 'taste' cannot create a new struc-
ture, it can only make adjustments to one that already 
exists. Taste loosens and tightens screws, it does not 
build a new piece of machinery. 
Taste makes adjustments. Giving birth is not its 
affair. 
Taste makes things ACCEPTABLE. 
(For this reason I believe that a great creator 
has no need of taste; his child is born into the world 
fully formed} 
Sometimes polishing is a function of taste, but 
sometimes not. I have taste. 
Even the most refined taste has nothing to do 
with creative power. 
Taste is refinement of sensitivity; but sensitivi-
ty does not do anything, it is purely receptive ... 
Taste can be charming, but not gripping (Wittgen-
stein 1980, 59e-60e}. 
Taste does not create; it supports the artistic 
conventions and practices already in existence, but leaves 
imagination and creativity alone. It is the artists who 
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create. You can say that "every composer changed the rules, 
but the variation was very slight; not all the rules were 
changed. The music was still good by a great many of the old 
rules" (Wittgenstein 1972, 5-6). They followed the rules, 
but they also changed them to suit themselves. Even if some 
rules stay the same, the artists are not completely bound by 
the rules. 
This is how rules and context evolve. Artists, by their 
very nature, create. This is more than a function of taste 
and judgment. It must be more than clever tricks or personal 
peculiarities, because these are insufficient to change old 
traditions or generate new ones. As innovative artists 
create, they affect those around them, including those who 
have achieved aesthetic mastery. Cultured taste and 
aesthetic mastery support tradition, but artistic genius 
creates tradition. It is genius that is "gripping", and that 
can lead to cultural progression. This is part of its 
necessary role, for without newness, a culture stagnates. 
"Taste ... can only go so far in a culture. Taste 
contributes only to the observances of a spiritual 
tradition in a culture, not to its spiritual pro-
gression. It is geared only for participating in 
established practices, not for their creation. It only 
brings about rearrangements of already created cultural 
elements {Lurie, 226) . 
Taste can only go so far and no further. A culture 
driven only by tastes is a decaying culture. If tradition 
dominates and remains unchanging, taste deteriorates. Even 
truth occasionally needs to be retold in a newer, more 
relevant way. If not, people may fail to listen. 
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You can get a picture of what you may call a very 
high culture ... and what happens when this deteriorates. 
A picture of what happens in Architecture when you get 
imitations-or when thousands of people are interested 
in the minutest details ... 
Explain what happens when a craft deteriorates. A 
period in which everything is fixed and extraordinary 
care is lavished on certain details; and a period in 
which everything is copied and nothing is thought about 
(Wittgenstein 1972, 7). 
Without new ideas and new forms of expression, art may 
completely degenerate into "arts and crafts," into imitation 
without creation, where there is minute attention to details 
but a lack of craftsmanship. 
What art requires is the presence of the tremendous. 
Benjamin Tilghman uses this term to draw a distinction 
between aesthetics and art itself. 
It is possible to characterize Wittgenstein's 
distinction between appreciation on the one hand and 
the tremendous on the other as a distinction between 
aesthetics and art ... In the visual arts, 
aesthetics ... is a matter of such things as lines, 
shapes, colours and the designs and arrangements that 
can be created out of them. For poetry it is a matter 
of rhyme, meter, alliteration and such things; the 
aesthetic materials of music are tonal relations, 
harmonies and the rest. To appreciate a thing and find 
it correct ... is pretty clearly to restrict one's 
attention to these aesthetic properties of things. By 
art I want to understand something that can be of great 
importance, that can have significance and meaning, and 
that can have depth (Tilghman, 87) . 
This distinction is at least partially valid. If all you do 
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is appreciate an artwork and look at its aesthetic quali-
ties, then you are limiting your view. But if you are limit-
ed in this way, then you have not achieved aesthetic 
mastery. While such mastery, or taste, may be limited in its 
ability to create original art, it is not limited in its 
ability to perceive meaning and depth. Simple taste and 
aesthetic appreciation may be so limited, but aesthetic 
mastery and cultured taste include aesthetic understanding, 
which is what is required for recognition of the tremendous, 
or of genius. It goes beyond the rules. "Soulful expression 
in music--this cannot be recognized by rules" (Wittgenstein 
1967, 28e). This recognition is guided by the intuition that 
is present in aesthetic mastery. It is capable of 
recognition beyond that of mere correctness. 
We talked of correctness. A good cutter won't use 
any words except words like 'Too long,' 'All right!.' 
When we talk of a symphony of Beethoven we don't talk 
of correctness. Entirely different things enter. One 
wouldn't talk of appreciating the tremendous things in 
Art. In certain styles in Architecture a door is cor-
rect, and the thing is you appreciate it. But in the 
case of a Gothic Cathedral what we do is not at all to 
find it correct--it plays an entirely different role 
with us. The entire game is different. It is as differ-
ent as to judge a human being and on the one hand to 
say 'He behaves well' and on the other hand 'He made a 
great impression on me' (Wittgenstein 1972, 7-8). 
Wittgenstein speaks of an entirely different game that 
is played by those things which are beyond correctness. The 
old game is a game of appreciation and taste; the new game 
is a game of genius and the tremendous. While the first game 
maintains the rules, the second creates them. 
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This distinction between the tremendous and the 
correct is of the greatest importance ... The great 
Gothic churches are anything but correct .... In the 
first place the idea of correctness enters only when 
the conventions of a style have been established and an 
artist is aware that he can opt to do another one of 
those with an eye on all the rules. The notion can 
hardly apply to the people whose works create the style 
and who certainly do not consciously think of them-
selves as working within a style. 
In the second place it is possible to be over-
whelmed, awe struck by such a construction. It can 
indeed be tremendous (Tilghman, 86-7}. 
Those who create the rules cannot be bound by rules that 
have not been established yet. Their innovations set new 
standards; this is the role of genius. Genius goes beyond 
skill and talent; it is tremendous. 
Genius is what makes us forget the master's talent. 
Genius is what makes us forget skill. 
Where genius wears thin, skill may show through. 
Genius is what prevents us from seeing the master's 
talent. 
Only where genius wears thin can you see the talent 
(Wittgenstein 1980, 43e). 
This passage brings to mind the so-called "primitive" 
painters who lack formal artistic training and experience 
and yet have an overpowering ability to create and inspire. 
Their gift goes beyond talent and skill. Skill is acquired, 
while talent is the ability to apply that skill. But genius 
is inborn, not learned. It is inspired, not taught. It is in 
the end a kind of being. Genius is a matter of character. 
The measure of genius is character, even though 
character on its own does not amount to genius. Genius 
is not 'talent plus character,' but character manifest-
ing itself in the form of a special talent. Just as one 
man will show courage by jumping into the water after 
someone, so another will show courage by writing a 
symphony. 
There is no more light in a genius than in any 
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other honest man - but he has a particular kind of lens 
to concentrate this light into a burning point ... 
One might say: Genius is talent exercised with 
courage (Wittgenstein 1980, 35e,38e). 
Bach said that all his achievements were simply 
the fruit of industry. But industry like that requires 
humility and an enormous capacity for suffering, hence 
strength. And someone who ... can also express himself 
perfecly, simply speaks to us in the language of a 
great man (Wittgenstein 1980, 71e). 
Genius is a matter of strength, greatness and humility. 
Beyond this is Wittgenstein's claim that Bach (and presuma-
bly, all great artists) expressed himself perfectly. Such 
clear expression is capable of conveying equally clear 
understanding in an attentive and perceptive audience. The 
greatness of the man and the music can perhaps inspire equal 
greatness in the understanding listener, by making her a 
little more aware of what is meaningful. 
Thus genius can provide for the spiritual progress that 
taste cannot. Genius takes its inspiration from life, from 
our feelings and drives and translates it for us into a form 
that is easier for us to hear and understand. 
Within all great art there is a WILD animal; 
tamed .... All great art has man's primitive drives as 
its groundbass. They are not the melody ... but they are 
what gives the melody its depth and power . 
... The house I built for Gretl is the product of a 
decidedly sensitive ear and good manners, an expression 
of great understanding (of a culture, etc.) But 
primordial life, wild life striving to erupt into the 
open--that is lacking (Wittgenstein 1980, 37e). 
Genius transforms wildness into art; it captures primordial 
rhythms and meanings and expresses them perfectly for those 
of us who fail to perceive them on our own. This ability is 
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what allows great works to transcend their culture and 
context. "The works of great masters are suns which rise and 
set around us. The time will come for every great work that 
is now in the descendent to rise again" (Wittgenstein 1980, 
lSe). What inspires these works, their 'spirit', is not 
limited by time or culture. 
CHAPTER 5 
ART AND MEANING 
The Spirit of Art 
Art for Art's Sake 
An important concept in Wittgenstein's theories of art 
and aesthetics is that of the intrinsic value of art, a 
value independent of any of the values with which we invest 
it. Art dealers and investors are concerned primarily with 
the monetary value of art, which may or may not correspond 
to the aesthetic value of art. Here, aesthetic understanding 
would be a tool to use in the hopes of discerning which art 
works are worth the investment. An art critic would also use 
aesthetic understanding as a means to increase his 
evaluative ability. For the seeker of understanding, there 
is no further goal beyond aesthetic understanding. Such a 
person pursues artistic training and experience in order to 
more fully experience, enjoy and understand art. Art has a 
great deal to communicate, and what it has to communicate is 
itself, which is not necessarily the same as what the artist 
felt in creating. 
There is a lot to be learned from Tolstoy's bad 
theorizing about how a work of art conveys 'a feeling'. 
You really could call it, not exactly the expression of 
a feeling, but at least an expression of feeling, or a 
felt expression. And you could say too that in so far 
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as people understand it, they 'resonate' in harmony 
with it, respond to it. You might say: the work of art 
does not aim to convey something else, just itself .... 
And it does start to get quite absurd if you say 
that an artist wants the feelings he had when writing 
to be experienced by someone else who reads his work. 
Presumably I can think I understand a poem (e.g.), 
understand it as its author would wish me to--but what 
he may have felt in writing it doesn't concern me at 
all (Wittgenstein 1980, SSe). 
An artwork may embody certain ideas and concepts that the 
author had in mind, but its purpose is not to make me feel 
like the author did. The artwork conveys understanding to me 
according to my own capabilities. It simply is, and I bring 
to it my perceptions as created by my culture and background 
in order to achieve an understanding of it. I do not regard 
it in order to achieve a particular 'feeling'. I read a poem 
for the sake of the poetry, because it is worth reading. 
There is a tendency to talk about the 'effect of a 
work of art'--feelings, images, etc. Then it is natural 
to ask: "Why do you hear this minuet?", and there is a 
tendency to answer: "To get this and that effect." And 
doesn't the minuet itself matter? Hearing this: would 
another have done so well? 
You could play a minuet once and get a lot out of 
it, and play the same minuet another time and get 
nothing out of it. But it doesn't follow that what you 
get out of it is then independent of the 
minuet .... (Wittgenstein 1972, 29). 
This 'effect' is not independent of the art work, 
though it may change over time. It is the viewer and his 
ability to perceive and understand that changes, not the 
piece itself. In this way an art work may be more 'meaning 
full' at one time than at another. It may have greater spirit. 
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Spirit and the Will 
What separates art from technical proficiency is its 
spirit. Art is 'inspired', while works that have technical 
proficiency may be pretty or fetching, but not tremendous or 
gripping. Spirit is what makes this difference, and it 
distinguishes the improvement of an artistic style from 
technical improvement. 
A modern film is to an old one as a present-day 
motor car is to one built 25 years ago. The impression 
it makes is just as ridiculous and clumsy and the way 
film-making has improved is comparable to the sort of 
technical improvement we see in cars. It is not to be 
compared with the improvement-if it's right to call it 
that-of an artistic style. It must be much the same 
with modern dance music too. A jazz dance, like a film, 
must be something that can be improved. What distin-
guishes all these developments from the formation of a 
style is the spirit plays no part in them (Wittgenstein 
1980, 3e). 
This is not to say that artistic style has no role to play 
in film-making or jazz dance. But the development of style 
is distinct from the technical improvement of something. In 
competition level figure skating, two scores are given per 
performance: one for technical merit and one for artistic 
impression. A skater can receive fairly low technical marks 
while still scoring highly in artistic impression. Her 
artistry may be greater than her technical skill, and they 
may develop separately. Style is concerned with spirit, and 
technical proficiency and technical improvement are possible 
without spirit. 
To improve an artistic style requires a strong spirit, 
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but not a spirit or character that is independent of the 
work of art. Rather, it is a spirit that is infused into the 
art work both by the will of the artist and by the nature of 
the art work itself. When we view or listen to the piece, 
this spirit of the art work acts on our own spirit to create 
the resonance that brings us in harmony with the work of 
art. "For it is only from yourself that you are acquainted 
with any spirit at all." {Wittgenstein) 
Being acquainted with your own spirit, your own life 
and meaning, you can recognize and resonate with the spirit 
found in a work of art. You can be "in tune" with the art 
work. The genius of the artist has translated the wildness, 
the 'snake' and the 'lion', and it brings forth 
understanding from the wildness in the observer. The 
artist's will and our will pierce the world and bring it 
meaning. The character of the will that so imposes itself 
will affect the character of the world. The world is what we 
make of it. 
Wittgenstein presents the will as an attitude of 
the subject of the world {Notebooks, p.87) ... we are 
told that the will, this attitude, penetrates the 
world, is good or evil, and is somehow connected with 
the meaning (Sinn) of the world. It also has to be the 
case, I believe, that the will is the source of the 
expression and the character that can be found in the 
world. {Tilghman, 52) 
This explains how genius and the tremendous can add to and 
direct the spiritual progression of the world. The character 
and will of genius permeates the world, and as we respond to 
that, our own will and character are strengthened and 
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improved. The willing subject is the subject that gives the 
world meaning. 
This attitude of the willing subject to the world plays 
a very important role in the language game of art. It is the 
willing subject, unconfined by the logical boundaries that 
limit the thinking (logical, rational) subject, that enables 
us to achieve understanding at all. 
The Unsayable in Art 
The Boundaries of the Sayable 
The distinction between the sayable and the unsayable 
has been important to Wittgenstein from the very beginning 
of his philosophic work. He felt that philosophy was on the 
wrong track, tackling the unsayable answers to literally 
unspeakable questions rather than providing descriptions and 
greater clarity for those issues about which something could 
be said. There is a great deal of mysticism in the Tractatus 
that many analytic philosophers seem simply to disregard as 
awkward or embarrassing. But for Wittgenstein, everything of 
any importance at all lay in this area of mysticism. 
Tilghman agrees with this assessment. 
The distinction between what can be pictured, that 
is said, and what can only be shown, the distinction 
between the sayable and the unsayable, becomes vitally 
important in the Tractatus. We can also add to the 
genus of the unsayable everything that is a matter of 
human value--ethics, aesthetics and those questions 
that are usually thought of as the stuff of religion. 
All of this latter Wittgenstein comprehends under the 
heading of the mystical (Tilghman, 44) . 
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These areas belong to the unsayable, but not the 
unreachable. What is important to understand is that we can 
only go so far with rationality and logic. The world itself 
is bounded by the mystical. We can speak about the world of 
logic and facts with the language of logic and facts. Beyond 
this world, another language game is necessary. Jay Shir 
articulates the difficulty . 
... the world is logical. 'Logic pervades the 
world,' rendering the world's boundaries identical with 
logic's own (Trac. 5.61). The world and logic share a 
common form which, however, the propositions of logic 
cannot represent. They can only 'show' it or 'display 
it' (Trac. 4.121). If the common form could ever be 
represented, that would constitute the representation 
of the world's meaning. Yet the difficulty is this: In 
order to represent logical form, we should have to be 
able to station ourselves with propositions somewhere 
outside logic, that is to say, outside the world (Trac. 
4.12). This is on the face of it impossible: since 
"Life is the world," to stand with propositions outside 
the world would be to stand outside life itself. The 
meaning of life, that 'problematic' thing, therefore 
becomes quite inaccessible when logic alone is used to 
approach it (Shir, 4). 
This is why Wittgenstein maintained that you could not 
compose meaningful propositions in the areas of ethics, 
aesthetics, religion and even philosophy. They deal with 
subjects and meanings that cannot be reduced to proposition-
al form. We cannot stand outside them and capture them in 
our scientific language game. We must enter in to them in 
order to understand or show them to anyone else in any 
meaningful way. 
"Only the intended picture reaches up to reality 
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like a yardstick. Looked at from outside, there it is, 
lifeless and isolated"--It is as if at first we looked 
at a picture so as to enter into it and the objects in 
it surrounded us like real ones; and then we stepped 
back, and were now outside it; we saw the frame, and 
the picture was a painted surface. In this way, when we 
intend, we are surrounded by our intention's pictures, 
and we are inside them. But when we step outside inten-
tion, they are mere patches on canvas, without life and 
of no interest to us. When we intend we exist in the 
space of intention, among the pictures (shadows) of 
intention, as well as with real things. Let us imagine 
we are sitting in a darkened cinema and entering into 
the film. Now the lights are turned on, though the film 
continues on the screen. But suddenly we are outside it 
and see it as movements of light and dark patches on a 
screen (Wittgenstein 1967, 42e). 
The 'outside' is the world of facts and reasons. When the 
lights are turned on, we try to see rationally and scientif-
ically. When it is dark, the art work is our whole world. 
Our intention, or our will, permeates the world and makes it 
meaningful. 
This space of intention is the world of the willing 
subject, who can go beyond the boundaries of the sayable and 
understand what can only be shown and not said. Standing 
outside puts us in the place of the man who mistakes the 
shadows of trees for the trees themselves and then tries to 
figure out what they really are (p. 21). In Wittgenstein's 
words, "his admiration will have suffered a rupture that 
will need healing" (Wittgenstein 1980, 57e). He has ceased 
to participate intentionally in the work and has re-entered 
the realm of reason and logic. He is thinking too much. He 
has ceased to be the willing subject in favor of the 
thinking subject, who is limited by the world's factual 
boundaries. He has placed himself outside the realm of the 
unsayable by trying to say rather than show. 
It is important to see the whole of the world of the 
art work, rather than to break it into pieces in order to 
make it more easily observable or analyzable. In trying to 
grasp it better through its parts, you shatter the world 
that it creates and in which it exists. Outside of this 
world and this perspective, its specialness is lost . 
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... when E. looks at what he has written and finds 
it marvellous (even though he would not care to publish 
any of the pieces individually), he's seeing his life 
as a work of art created by God and, as such, it is 
certainly worth contemplating, as is every life and 
everything whatever. But only an artist can so 
represent an individual thing as to make it appear to 
us like a work of art; it is right that those manu-
scripts should lose their value when regarded disinter-
estedly, i.e. by someone who doesn't feel enthusiastic 
about them in advance. A work of art forces us ... to see 
it in the right perspective but, in the absence of art, 
the object is just a fragment of nature like any other 
.... (Wittgenstein 1980, 4e) 
Taken as a whole, E.'s life is a work of art, even though 
separately the parts may not be meaningful. It is only as a 
whole that they have the capacity to be seen in this way. 
Life and everything else of meaning must be viewed with 
interest and enthusiasm, 'willfully' and intentionally. It 
is only then that things have value. 
It is only the areas of the mystical that have these 
properties, because the areas of the sayable are not 
'valuable,' at least not in the sense of giving meaning and 
moral value to life. 
If good and evil willing affects the world it can 
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only affect the boundaries of the world, not the facts, 
what cannot be portrayed by language but can only be 
shown in language {Wittgenstein 1961, p. 73). 
Poetic language can show what cannot be said, as can art in 
general. It can portray that which has value and meaning in 
such a way that it can be understood and valued by the 
receptive observer. Art puts the world and life in the right 
perspective. 
The Importance of the Unsayable 
Here it is difficult as it were to keep one's head 
up, to see that we must stick to the subjects of our 
every-day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that 
we have to describe extreme subtleties, which in turn 
we are after all quite unable to describe with the 
means at our disposal. We feel as if we had to repair a 
torn spider's web with our own fingers (Wittgenstein 
1958, 46e) . 
The instruments {language, words, etc.) at our disposal 
are too blunt to use in saying the unsayable. They can be 
used to reveal what cannot be said only in the form of 
poetry and literature. Because of this, literature and the 
other arts are of the greatest importance. Our scientific 
rational forms of explanation and inquiry can guide us in 
the natural world and tell us about our everyday affairs, 
but only through the unsayable can we understand that which 
should be of most importance in our lives. 
The world in the totality of facts is the world 
investigated by science and the correct description of 
those facts is the concern of science. By making the 
distinction he did between what can and cannot be said, 
Wittgenstein effectively separated all questions of 
human value and the importance of human life from 
scientific questions {Tilghman, 44) . 
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Science can tell what is best for us to eat. It can tell us 
how to keep warm or how to get from one place to another in 
the shortest possible amount of time. It can design faster 
and more accurate computers to do a phenomenal number of 
calculations and run incredibly useful programs. All of 
science's achievements are pursued in order to achieve some 
further, practical results, but none of these add intrinsic 
value to our lives. "There is no value in the world since 
all facts and all propositions representing the facts are 
all on the same level. All value, the meaning of the world 
and of life, in some sense stands outside the world" 
(Tilghman, 43). 
In standing outside the world, value and meaning are 
placed beyond the reach of science. Contrary to what the 
positivists assumed, this was not because these were either 
meaningless questions or questions of no value. In fact, 
these are the questions of highest value and most meaning. 
"His purpose in making these distinctions was to emphasise 
the importance of that area he called the mystical and to 
preserve it from the tyranny of the sciences, not to dismiss 
it" (Tilghman, 17). This is exactly what he does in the 
Tractatus, and later in the Investigations, both highly 
ethical in character. 
For Wittgenstein, metaphysics, ethics, religion 
and art all belong to the realm of the transcendental 
which cannot be said but only shown. It would 
indeed be nonsense to contend as Stenius does, 'what is 
inexpressible is just nonsense and nothing else.' The 
inexpressible (or the mystical) is everything that is 
77 
important in life. The whole point of the Tractatus is 
precisely to show the inexpressible by exhibiting 
clearly the expressible (Fann, 27) . 
Wittgenstein himself expressed this important distinc-
tion in a letter to Ludwig von Ficker, with whom he was 
trying to arrange for publication of the Tractatus . 
... I wanted to write that my work consists of two 
parts: of the one which is here, and of everything 
which I have not written. And precisely this second 
part is the important one. For the Ethical is delimited 
from within, as it were, by my book; and I'm convinced 
that, strictly speaking, it can ONLY be delimited in 
this way. In brief, I think: All of that which many are 
babbling today, I have defined in my book by remaining 
silent about it ... (Luckhardt, 94-5). 
The many were 'babbling' because that was all they could do 
with the way they were trying to 'mend spider's webs.' If 
you try to answer questions about the meaning of life in 
sensible, rational terms, all you get is meaninglessness. 
Such issues cannot be framed in rational language. It is 
very similar to saying that God can only be found by faith, 
not by reason. A rational man can have faith, but only 
through a 'leap of faith.' 
Wittgenstein's leap was a leap across the boundary 
between the expressible and the inexpressible, and the only 
way he saw for the inexpressible to be shown was through 
ethics, religion and especially through art. "In art, in 
'mysticism,' man searches for spiritual satisfaction that he 
seeks vainly through reason: once found, such satisfaction 
cannot be qualified or presented in any way on the rational 
plane" (Shir, 7). This is why artistic genius can stimulate 
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a spiritual progression that a culture will otherwise lack. 
The particular language game of art is capable of embodying 
greater truths than our scientific language. 
Describe the aroma of coffee.--Why can't it be 
done? Do we lack the words? And for what are words 
lacking?--But how do we get the idea that such a de-
scription must after all be possible? Have you ever 
felt the lack of such a description? Have you tried to 
describe the aroma and not succeeded? (I should like to 
say: "These notes say something glorious, but I do not 
know what." These notes are a powerful gesture, but I 
cannot put anything side by side with it that will 
serve as an explanation. A grave nod. James: "Our 
vocabulary is inadequate." Then why don't we introduce 
a new one? What would have to be the case for us to be 
able to?) (Wittgenstein 1958, 159e). 
In such a case we are reduced to metaphor, trying to 
describe figuratively something that we cannot approach 
logically with any coherence. To be able to do so would 
require a language and vocabulary unlike any one we have, 
one based on some other form than the propositional. As it 
is, we show what we know to be true in our art, seen against 
the background of the world. 
Art and the World 
The difficulty in finding some way to convey the inex-
pressible is finding a way to grasp it, to take it in in 
some meaningful way without belittling or diminishing it. 
Our scientifically based language is not capable of doing 
this. This is not due to a lack in the language as such, but 
rather to the nature of what such a language is "designed" 
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to grasp. Although the facts and ideas of science are not 
intrinsically valuable in the way that the truths of the 
inexpressible are, we endow them with meaning in terms of 
our lives and our search for greater meaning. "Perhaps what 
is inexpressible (what I find mysterious and am not able to 
express) is the background against which whatever I could 
express has its meaning" (Wittgenstein 1980, 16e). Art has 
its own meaning embodied in music, poetry, painting. The 
mystical serves as the background for these, a language 
context within which the meaning resides. 
It is queer that Busch's drawings can often be 
called 'metaphysical.' Is there such a thing as a 
metaphysical style of drawing then? - "Seen against the 
background of the eternal" you might say. However, 
these strokes have such a meaning only within a whole 
language. And it is a language without grammar; you 
couldn't say what its rules are (Wittgenstein 1980, 
75e). 
The strokes by themselves are merely dabs of paint; without 
context to imbue them with meaning, they are parts of an 
unattainable whole. The art work must be seen with its 
background in order to achieve its purpose. 
We may think of the work of art as a system and in 
the case, say, of a painting, the subject of the paint-
ing as an element within that system. To pursue the 
analogy between the work of art seen as a world and the 
world itself we must assume that in the Tractatus 
scheme of things the particular elements of a work of 
art, the notes and harmonies from which a piece of 
music is constructed, the figures and colours that make 
up a painting and so on, considered in themselves have 
no value, no significance. It is only when they are 
seen as a system, that is as a whole, as necessarily 
connected with one another, when seen under the aspect 
of eternity, do they have value and a sense. Part of 
that sense and value is surely the character and ex-
pression that the work presents to the one who contem-
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plates it (Tilghman, 55-56). 
Just as the individual parts of a man's life may seem value-
less while the whole is meaningful, so it is with the work 
of art. Taken moment by moment, a life can be a disaster, a 
joke, or simply dry and colorless. Taken as a whole, with 
each moment and event affecting others both within the same 
life and in different lives, it can be a work of art. What 
is necessary is to see things in the right perspective. For 
art, this perspective must be intentional and "wholistic". 
When seen from this perspective the art object becomes the 
world for the observer, art seen sub specie aeterni. This is 
to see it as a whole, to see it "together with the whole 
logical space" (Wittgenstein 1961, 83). The value of art is 
its ability to allow us to see things sub specie 
aeternitatis, against the background of the eternal, and 
thus to see how they fit into the world and our lives. The 
artistic subject is displayed in relation to us and to the 
world, and is made completely valuable. 
If I have been contemplating the stove, and then am 
told: but now all you know is the stove, my result does 
indeed seem trivial. For this represents the matter as 
if I had studied the stove as one amo~g the many th~ngs 
in the world. But if I was contemplat1ng the stove ~t 
was my world, and everyth~ng else colourless by con-
trast with it (Wittgensteln 1961, 83). 
The power of art is its ability to take ordinary 
objects and bring them to life in new and valuable ways. 
Seen as art, things that we exist with and ignore every day 
· · new ways. Art forces a new 
are brought into v1ew ln 
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perspective on us, allowing us to enjoy all aspects of life. 
Only an artist can so represent an individual 
thing as to make it appear to us like a work of art ... A 
work of art forces us - as we might say - to see it in 
the right perspective, but in the absence of art, the 
object is just a fragment of nature like any other 
(Wittgenstein 1980, 4e). 
This is the role of art and the artist: to put things 
in the right perspective, the right perspective for us as 
human beings. The work of art, as it becomes our world, 
serves to represent the whole, to bring the whole world and 
its meaning to us in a microcosm. Art allows us to see 
things from the realm of the inexpressible, from outside the 
logical, rational realm in which we reside. Thus the role of 
art is not only aesthetic, but ethical. Art brings meaning 
into our lives and allows us to see meaningfully. It brings 
us closer to "the good life." 
The work of art is the object seen sub specie 
aeternitatis; and the good life is the world seen sub 
specie aeternitatis. This is the connexion between art 
and ethics. 
The usual way of looking at things sees objects as 
it were from the midst of them, the view sub specie 
aeternitatis from outside. 
In such a way that they have the whole world as 
background (Wittgenstein 1961, 83e) 
By seeing art sub specie aeter.nitatis, we are enabled to see 
the world sub specie aeternitatis. Ethics and aesthetics are 
one. Tilghman expresses this concept well. 
There are several parallels between the Tractatus 
conception of ethics and aesthetics and one important 
relation binding them. They are parallel in that both 
belong to the domain of the unsayable; just as there 
are no ethical propositions, so there are no proposi-
tions stating aesthetic judgments. Both values can only 
be shown. Both involve a way of looking at things that 
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is contemplative. Ethics is involved in a certain kind 
of view of the world as a whole and aesthetics entails 
a contemplative view of an object considered as a world 
unto itself. Neither serves any purpose. Aesthetic 
value is an end in itself and the ethical life is its 
own reward. The ethical view of the world imputes a 
certain spirit or character to the world, and the 
aesthetic view finds spirit and character in the work 
of art which is understood as an expression. In addi-
tion to these parallels and analogies, ethics and 
aesthetics are intimately related in that art is one of 
the most important ways in which ethical value can be 
shown and a solution to the problem of life made mani-
fest (Tilghman, 64-65}. 
Ethical values are demonstrated through art, and in this way 
an ethical spirit or character is imparted to the world. 
Here again, in a more detailed fashion, is the role of art 
as a leader in the spiritual progression of humanity. Art, 
with its human message, feeds our hungry spirits with eter-
nal truths. In Wittgenstein's view, art is certainly the 
best and maybe the only method in which these truths can be 
conveyed. 
If at least part of what it means to say that 
ethics and aesthetics are one is that only through art 
can the sense and value of a life and of the world be 
shown, then the oft-quoted parenthetical comment that 
Frank Ramsey made, with one eye on the Tractatus, 'But 
what we can't say we can't say, and we can't whistle it 
either,' is surely off the mark as it applies to 
Wittgenstein's notion of the ethical .... We have to 
conclude that what cannot be said about the ethical is 
just exactly what can be whistled, that is shown in a 
piece of music or other work of art. And here we must 
remember that among his artistic and musical accom-
plishments Wittgenstein was a great whistler (Tilghman, 
64} . 
CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Art, Life and Happiness 
Because the meaning that art has to convey is so diffi-
cult to articulate, the tendency is to dispute or diminish 
its value. Knowledge is important, but we normally measure 
knowledge by how much you know and how well you can express 
this knowledge. If you cannot express what you know in a 
clear, coherent manner, then how can you say that you know 
it? "I just know" is the last resort of the stubborn 
individual who refuses to give in to greater, i.e. rational, 
knowledge. Knowledge is information. I display my knowledge 
in facts. 
The meaning displayed in art is not embodied in facts. 
Art is not informational. Art may detail historical images, 
but it is not always intended to be historically factual or 
educational, at least not in the same way as a history 
course. Paintings and literature may be informative in what 
they have to tell us about the time in which they were 
created, but it is the meaning that transcends these 
contexts that is of greatest value in Art. It is the human 
value that is important. Art has much to teach us, but it is 
of a different character than the instruction with which we 
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are familiar. 
"People nowadays think that scientists exist to 
instruct them, poets, musicians, etc. to give them pleasure. 
The idea that these have something to teach them, - that 
does not occur to them" (Wittgenstein 1980, 36e). We do 
study Art, but the approach is not the type to which Witt-
genstein was referring. I can learn much in terms of aes-
thetic rules and context from art and music appreciation 
courses, but they are not trying to teach me aesthetic 
understanding. I am not taught to perceive the deeper 
meaning that resides in the artistic medium. For Wittgen-
stein, this meaning is more important than any more purely 
scientific information, or any well described philosophical 
theory, for that matter. Nothing does as well as art in 
showing us what is most important in life. 
Tilghman affirms this view of Wittgenstein in a passage 
he quotes from Wittgenstein's Vienna, by Stephen Toulmin and 
Allan Janik: 
Their contention is that the Tractatus "assigns a 
central importance in human life to art, on the ground 
that art alone can express the meaning of life. Only 
art can express moral truth, and only the artist can 
teach the things that matter most in life" (Tilghman, 
62-63). 
This places the artist in a very privileged position, but it 
substantiates the claim that artists are capable of guiding 
the spiritual progression of others. They are endowed with a 
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gift that permits them both to perceive and to convey mean-
ing on a profound and vitally important level. Art can go 
beyond words in its ability to express. "Art is a kind of 
expression. Good art is complete expression" (Wittgenstein 
1961, 83e) Good art leaves nothing left to say. 
As expression, art is not lacking in the way our 
propositional language game is. When complete understanding 
is achieved, its transmittal seems nothing short of 
instantaneous, and is truly mystical. Like mystical 
experiences of the more traditional variety, it cannot be 
accurately and consistently reproduced by others. I can tell 
you how I achieved my understanding, but not completely. I 
can tell you what I was reading, how I felt, how I moved and 
listened, and other technical and trivial details, but your 
copying me exactly will not guarantee that your response 
will be the same. It may be that you achieve understanding 
differently. This is the point of saying that art and 
aesthetics cannot be reduced to a science. I can give you 
tips that helped me, but I cannot give any certain 
assurances that your experience will be the same. This 
results in part from the differences between us and the ways 
in which we approach the world. 
One advantage that art has is that it can bring 
different people to see things in the same way. Although the 
artist's intention and how he felt while creating may not 
ultimately be valuable, it still remains true that the best 
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artwork has captured the artist's vision, and the artist has 
superior vision. Our own individual perspectives differ 
radically and it is difficult to overcome these differences. 
Art, with its more direct, more concentrated view can force 
us to see deeper and more meaningfully, overcoming 
differences and enabling us to see things in the right way. 
It is not impossible for the world to do this also, but it 
is more difficult. Art is created to be observed, it is its 
very nature to be looked at, read, listened to, to be 
studied with concentration. It captures our attention in a 
way that our world, indeed our lives, do not. If the world 
does not force the right perspective on us, perhaps it is 
because we are not paying attention. However, remember that 
Wittgenstein considered that each life could be seen as a 
work of Art. If this is true, then life's meaning can be 
perceived through other mediums than human art, most notably 
through the world itself and our interactions with it. 
"Aesthetically, the miracle is that the world 
exists. That what exists does exist." The artist ac-
cepts that miracle, shows it forth in his work and 
makes it the stuff of joy: "Is it the essence of the 
artist's way of looking at things, that it looks at the 
world with a happy eye?" (Shir, 6) 
This 'happy eye,' not to be confused with a cheery attitude 
or positive outlook, allows the artist to portray what she 
sees, not just with her physical eyes, but with her inner 
'happy' eye, her eye for happiness. This eye sees more 
deeply and more clearly. We all have been in awe of natural 
beauty, but it is the rare artist who can express this 
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aspect of the tremendous in their art. 
The miracles of nature. One might say art shows us 
the miracles of nature. It is based on the concept of 
the miracles of nature. (The blossom, just opening out. 
What is marvellous about it?) We say: "Just look at it 
opening out!" (Wittgenstein 1980, 56e). 
The artist shows us what we might miss in looking at 
the world ourselves, with our lack of awareness. They make 
us "see it this way," showing us things in the right 
perspective, taking us out of our own hurried, inadequate 
perspective. We are so busy living our lives that we seldom 
take time to see what life means. "Life is serious, art is 
gay" (Wittgenstein 1961, 83). Art pursues happiness in a way 
life should, but life, in its human embodiment, takes itself 
too seriously without pursuing what is truly important. 
Art is not all happy in the sense of cheerful. It is 
striking, profound, often desperately powerful. But it is 
meaningful, as happiness is meaningful, and as life is 
meaningful when it is lived completely, in full awareness. 
Ethics and aesthetics are activities that can increase this 
awareness. As studying the rules can refine your aesthetic 
perception, so can pursuing ethical and aesthetic meaning 
refine your perception of meaning and life. "Both activities 
must be carried on beyond the bourn of analysis. Both have 
to do with the happy existence, which Wittgenstein singles 
out as the summum bonum" (Shir, 3). 
The happy life is the proper end of man. This is not a 
feeling of perpetual contentment, all desires satisfied and 
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a smile on your face. The happy life is the life of meaning, 
the right way of living, simply because it is the right way 
to live. Art is the way to happy life, "for there is 
certainly something in the conception that the end of art is 
the beautiful ... And the beautiful is what makes happy" 
(Wittgenstein 1961, 86e). 
I keep on coming back to this! simply the happy 
life is good, the unhappy bad. And if I now ask myself: 
But why should I live happily, then this of itself 
seems to me to be a tautological question; the happy 
life seems to be justified, of itself, it seems that it 
is the only right life. 
But this is really in some sense deeply mysteri-
ous! It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed! 
But we could say The happy life seems to be in 
some sense more harmonious than the unhappy. But in 
what sense?? 
What is the objective mark of the happy, harmoni-
ous life? Here it is again clear that there cannot be 
any such mark, that can be described. 
This mark cannot be a physical one but only a 
metaphysical one, a transcendental one (Wittgenstein 
1961, 78e). 
Happiness, like aesthetic understanding, cannot be 
measured in discrete amounts. It comes from a certain way of 
living and of exerting your will, but not in the sense of 
becoming happy "by force of will." You must bring your will 
into line with the world and be in agreement with the world 
to achieve a harmonious life. That is what "being happy" 
means. 
In so far as literary work X increases my appreci-
ation of the world's existing as it does, it similarly 
increases my acceptance of the world; in the same 
degree, therefore, it increases the sum of happiness in 
my life. To that extent I may call X beautiful, and 
value it accordingly; "for the beautiful is what makes 
happy" (Shir, 7). 
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By our perceptive consideration of art and the 
incorporation of its teachings into our lives, we make our 
lives happier, in that they are more meaningful and 
complete. We are more in tune with the world and with life, 
like a piece of music that is expressively played. And here 
Tilghman reflects Wittgenstein's view of life as a work of 
art. 
When one finds a 'solution' to the problem of 
one's own life and the world waxes happy and looks back 
at you with a happy spirit, could we not say that one's 
life and the world has become like a work of art? 
(Tilghman, 62) 
"Smile and the world smiles with you ... " Here is the 
artist's happy eye, one which each of us would do well to 
cultivate. The happy eye sees the meaning in the world, and 
the will forces the world to conform. "The world of the 
happy is a happy world" (Wittgenstein 1961, 78). It is the 
willing subject that introduces good and evil, and beauty 
and ugliness as well, into the world. The world is the realm 
of propositions and logic, of what can be clearly and defin-
itively spoken. The world of the will, of the I, is that of 
art and aesthetics, where we make our own world. 
If we assume that it is a person's actions and the 
way those actions are performed that create a life, 
then the ethical desert of those actions is simply that 
life itself, and since life and the world are said to 
be one, the ethical reward is nothing else but the face 
with which the world looks back at you. To complete the 
account let us remember that the face that looks back 
at you is your own; it is tempting to speculate that 
your ethical reward is no more or less than the discov-
ery of your own character. 
Let us note that this way of looking at the conse-
quences of our actions provides the ethical analogue of 
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aesthetic rightness. Getting things right aestheti-
cally, getting say, the proportions of the room correct 
or changing the bass until it moves just as it should 
serves no further purpose but is an end in itself. In 
like manner, living the good life is not a step toward 
some further goal, it is an end in itself, it is its 
own reward (Tilghman, 60-61) . 
Ultimately, art and aesthetic understanding are essen-
tial to the good life. It is possible that without them, a 
life may be pleasant, and the person who lives it will never 
know what they have missed. However, while knowledge isn't 
everything, the good life is. If you question Wittgenstein's 
basic assumptions about the role of the mystical and the aim 
of life, remember: " ... one must either accept or reject 
these assumptions rather than expect to be convinced of 
their validity. They provide grounding not for dispassionate 
discussion but for a corpus of belief, a credo. They cannot 
be argued for or against" (Shir, 3). 
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